Grant Negotiation and Authorization Protocol

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

This document contains non-normative examples of partial and complete HTTP messages, JSON structures, URLs, query components, keys, and other elements. Some examples use a single trailing backslash \ to indicate line wrapping for long values, as per [RFC8792]. The \ character and leading spaces on wrapped lines are not part of the value.¶

1.2. Roles

The parties in GNAP perform actions under different roles. Roles are defined by the actions taken and the expectations leveraged on the role by the overall protocol.¶

+-------------+            +------------+
|             |            |            |
|Authorization|            |  Resource  |
|   Server    |            |   Server   |
|             |<--+   +--->|            |
+-------------+   |   |    +------------+
        +         |   |
        +         |   |
        +         |   |
        +         |   |
        +         |   |
        +      +----------+
        +      |  Client  |
        +      | Instance |
        +      +----------+
        +           +
        +           +
        +           +
+-----------+       +     +------------+
|           |       + + + |            |
|  Resource |             |    End     |
|   Owner   | ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ |    User    |
|           |             |            |
+-----------+             +------------+

Legend

+ + + indicates interaction between a human and computer
----- indicates interaction between two pieces of software
~ ~ ~ indicates a potential equivalence or out-of-band
          communication between roles

Authorization Server (AS)

server that grants delegated privileges to a particular instance of client software in the form of access tokens or other information (such as subject information).¶

Client

application that consumes resources from one or several RSs, possibly requiring access privileges from one or several ASs. The client is operated by the end-user or it runs autonomously on behalf of a resource owner.¶

Example: a client can be a mobile application, a web application, etc.¶

Note: this specification differentiates between a specific instance (the client instance, identified by its unique key) and the software running the instance (the client software). For some kinds of client software, there could be many instances of that software, each instance with a different key.¶

Resource Server (RS)

server that provides operations on protected resources, where operations require a valid access token issued by an AS.¶

Resource Owner (RO)

subject entity that may grant or deny operations on resources it has authority upon.¶

Note: the act of granting or denying an operation may be manual (i.e. through an interaction with a physical person) or automatic (i.e. through predefined organizational rules).¶

End-user

natural person that operates a client instance.¶

Note: that natural person may or may not be the same entity as the RO.¶

The design of GNAP does not assume any one deployment architecture, but instead attempts to define roles that can be fulfilled in a number of different ways for different use cases. As long as a given role fulfills all of its obligations and behaviors as defined by the protocol, GNAP does not make additional requirements on its structure or setup.¶

Multiple roles can be fulfilled by the same party, and a given party can switch roles in different instances of the protocol. For example, the RO and end-user in many instances are the same person, where a user is authorizing the client instance to act on their own behalf at the RS. In this case, one party fulfills both of the RO and end-user roles, but the roles themselves are still defined separately from each other to allow for other use cases where they are fulfilled by different parties.¶

For another example, in some complex scenarios, an RS receiving requests from one client instance can act as a client instance for a downstream secondary RS in order to fulfill the original request. In this case, one piece of software is both an RS and a client instance from different perspectives, and it fulfills these roles separately as far as the overall protocol is concerned.¶

A single role need not be deployed as a monolithic service. For example, A client instance could have components that are installed on the end-user's device as well as a back-end system that it communicates with. If both of these components participate in the delegation protocol, they are both considered part of the client instance. If there are several copies of the client software that run separately but all share the same key material, such as a deployed cluster, then this cluster is considered a single client instance.¶

In these cases, the distinct components of what is considered a GNAP client instance may use any number of different communication mechanisms between them, all of which would be considered an implementation detail of the client instances and out of scope of GNAP.¶

For another example, an AS could likewise be built out of many constituent components in a distributed architecture. The component that the client instance calls directly could be different from the component that the RO interacts with to drive consent, since API calls and user interaction have different security considerations in many environments. Furthermore, the AS could need to collect identity claims about the RO from one system that deals with user attributes while generating access tokens at another system that deals with security rights. From the perspective of GNAP, all of these are pieces of the AS and together fulfill the role of the AS as defined by the protocol. These pieces may have their own internal communications mechanisms which are considered out of scope of GNAP.¶

1.3. Elements

In addition to the roles above, the protocol also involves several elements that are acted upon by the roles throughout the process.¶

Attribute

characteristics related to a subject.¶

Access Token

a data artifact representing a set of rights and/or attributes.¶

Note: an access token can be first issued to an client instance (requiring authorization by the RO) and subsequently rotated.¶

Grant

(verb): to permit an instance of client software to receive some attributes at a specific time and valid for a specific duration and/or to exercise some set of delegated rights to access a protected resource (noun): the act of granting.¶

Privilege

right or attribute associated with a subject.¶

Note: the RO defines and maintains the rights and attributes associated to the protected resource, and might temporarily delegate some set of those privileges to an end-user. This process is refered to as privilege delegation.¶

Protected Resource

protected API (Application Programming Interface) served by an RS and that can be accessed by a client, if and only if a valid access token is provided.¶

Note: to avoid complex sentences, the specification document may simply refer to resource instead of protected resource.¶

Right

ability given to a subject to perform a given operation on a resource under the control of an RS.¶

Subject

person, organization or device. It decides whether and under which conditions its attributes can be disclosed to other parties.¶

Subject Information

statement asserted by an AS about a subject.¶

1.4. Trust relationships

GNAP defines its trust objective as: "the RO trusts the AS to ensure access validation and delegation of protected resources to end-users, through third party clients."¶

This trust objective can be decomposed into trust relationships between software elements and roles, especially the pairs end-user/RO, end-user/client, client/AS, RS/RO, AS/RO, AS/RS. Trust of an agent by its pair can exist if the pair is informed that the agent has made a promise to follow the protocol in the past (e.g. pre-registration, uncompromised cryptographic components) or if the pair is able to infer by indirect means that the agent has made such a promise (e.g. a compliant client request). Each agent defines its own valuation function of promises given or received. Examples of such valuations can be the benefits from interacting with other agents (e.g. safety in client access, interoperability with identity standards), the cost of following the protocol (including its security and privacy requirements and recommendations), a ranking of promise importance (e.g. a policy decision made by the AS), the assessment of one's vulnerability or risk of not being able to defend against threats, etc. Those valuations may depend on the context of the request. For instance, the AS may decide to either take into account or discard hints provided by the client, the RS may refuse bearer tokens, etc. depending on the specific case in which GNAP is used. Some promises can be conditional of some previous interactions (e.g. repeated requests).¶

Looking back on each trust relationship:¶

• end-user/RO: this relationship exists only when the end-user and the RO are different, in which case the end-user needs some out of band mechanism of getting the RO consent (see Section 4). GNAP generally assumes that humans can be authenticated thanks to identity protocols (for instance, through an id_token assertion in Section 2.2).¶
• end-user/client: the client acts as a user agent. Depending on the technology used (browser, SPA, mobile application, IoT device, etc.), some interactions may or may not be possible (as described in Section 2.5.1). Client developers promise to implement requirements and generally some recommendations or best practices, so that the end-users may confidently use their software. However, end-users might also be facing some attacker's client software, without even realizing it.¶
• end-user / AS: when the client supports it (see Section 3.3), the end-user gets to interact with front-channel URLs provided by the AS. See Section 12.25 for some considerations in trusting these interactions.¶
• client/AS: An honest AS may be facing an attacker's client (as discussed just above), or the reverse, and GNAP aims at making common attacks impractical. The core specification makes access tokens opaque to the client and defines the request/response scheme in detail, therefore avoiding extra trust hypotheses from this critical piece of software. Yet the AS may further define cryptographic attestations or optional rules to simplify the access of clients it already trusts, due to past behavior or organizational policies (see Section 2.3).¶
• RS/RO: the RS promises it protects its resources from unauthorized access, and only accepts valid access tokens issued by a trusted AS. In case tokens are key bound, proper validation is expected from the RS.¶
• AS/RO: the AS is expected to follow the decisions made by the RO, either through interactive consent requests, repeated interactions or automated rules (as described in Section 1.5). Privacy considerations aim to reduce the risk of an honest but too curious AS, or the consequences of an unexpected user data exposure.¶
• AS/RS: the AS promises to issue valid access tokens to legitimate client requests (i.e. after carrying out appropriate due diligence, as defined in the GNAP protocol). Some optional configurations are covered by [I-D.ietf-gnap-resource-servers].¶

A global assumption made by GNAP is that authorization requests are security and privacy sensitive, and appropriate measures are respectively detailed in Section 12 and Section 13.¶

A formal trust model is out of scope of this specification, but might be carried out thanks to [promise-theory].¶

1.5. Sequences

GNAP can be used in a variety of ways to allow the core delegation process to take place. Many portions of this process are conditionally present depending on the context of the deployments, and not every step in this overview will happen in all circumstances.¶

Note that a connection between roles in this process does not necessarily indicate that a specific protocol message is sent across the wire between the components fulfilling the roles in question, or that a particular step is required every time. For example, for a client instance interested in only getting subject information directly, and not calling an RS, all steps involving the RS below do not apply.¶

In some circumstances, the information needed at a given stage is communicated out of band or is preconfigured between the components or entities performing the roles. For example, one entity can fulfil multiple roles, and so explicit communication between the roles is not necessary within the protocol flow. Additionally some components may not be involved in all use cases. For example, a client instance could be calling the AS just to get direct user information and have no need to get an access token to call an RS.¶

    +------------+         +------------+
    | End-user   | ~ ~ ~ ~ |  Resource  |
    |            |         | Owner (RO) |
    +------------+         +------------+
          +                       +
          +                       +
          (A)                     (B)
          +                       +
          +                       +
    +--------+                    +          +------------+
    | Client | (1)                +          |  Resource  |
    |Instance|                    +          |   Server   |
    |        |       +---------------+       |    (RS)    |
    |        |--(2)->| Authorization |       |            |
    |        |<-(3)--|     Server    |       |            |
    |        |       |      (AS)     |       |            |
    |        |--(4)->|               |       |            |
    |        |<-(5)--|               |       |            |
    |        |--------------(6)------------->|            |
    |        |       |               |   (7) |            |
    |        |<-------------(8)------------->|            |
    |        |--(9)->|               |       |            |
    |        |<-(10)-|               |       |            |
    |        |--------------(11)------------>|            |
    |        |       |               |  (12) |            |
    |        |-(13)->|               |       |            |
    |        |       |               |       |            |
    +--------+       +---------------+       +------------+

Legend
+ + + indicates a possible interaction with a human
----- indicates an interaction between protocol roles
~ ~ ~ indicates a potential equivalence or out-of-band
        communication between roles

• (A) The end-user interacts with the client instance to indicate a need for resources on behalf of the RO. This could identify the RS the client instance needs to call, the resources needed, or the RO that is needed to approve the request. Note that the RO and end-user are often the same entity in practice, but GNAP makes no general assumption that they are.¶
• (1) The client instance determines what access is needed and which AS to approach for access. Note that for most situations, the client instance is pre-configured with which AS to talk to and which kinds of access it needs, but some more dynamic processes are discussed in Section 9.1.¶
• (2) The client instance requests access at the AS (Section 2).¶
• (3) The AS processes the request and determines what is needed to fulfill the request. (See Section 4.) The AS sends its response to the client instance (Section 3).¶
• (B) If interaction is required, the AS interacts with the RO (Section 4) to gather authorization. The interactive component of the AS can function using a variety of possible mechanisms including web page redirects, applications, challenge/response protocols, or other methods. The RO approves the request for the client instance being operated by the end-user. Note that the RO and end-user are often the same entity in practice, and many of GNAP's interaction methods allow the client instance to facilitate the end user interacting with the AS in order to fulfill the role of the RO.¶
• (4) The client instance continues the grant at the AS (Section 5).¶
• (5) If the AS determines that access can be granted, it returns a response to the client instance (Section 3) including an access token (Section 3.2) for calling the RS and any directly returned information (Section 3.4) about the RO.¶
• (6) The client instance uses the access token (Section 7.2) to call the RS.¶
• (7) The RS determines if the token is sufficient for the request by examining the token. The means of the RS determining this access are out of scope of this specification, but some options are discussed in [I-D.ietf-gnap-resource-servers].¶
• (8) The client instance calls the RS (Section 7.2) using the access token until the RS or client instance determine that the token is no longer valid.¶
• (9) When the token no longer works, the client instance fetches an updated access token (Section 6.1) based on the rights granted in (5).¶
• (10) The AS issues a new access token (Section 3.2) to the client instance.¶
• (11) The client instance uses the new access token (Section 7.2) to call the RS.¶
• (12) The RS determines if the new token is sufficient for the request. The means of the RS determining this access are out of scope of this specification, but some options are discussed in [I-D.ietf-gnap-resource-servers].¶
• (13) The client instance disposes of the token (Section 6.2) once the client instance has completed its access of the RS and no longer needs the token.¶

The following sections and Appendix D contain specific guidance on how to use GNAP in different situations and deployments. For example, it is possible for the client instance to never request an access token and never call an RS, just as it is possible for there not to be a user involved in the delegation process.¶

+--------+                                  +--------+         +------+
| Client |                                  |   AS   |         | User |
|Instance|                                  |        |         |      |
|        |< (1) + Start Session + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +|      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |--(2)--- Request Access --------->|        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |<-(3)-- Interaction Needed -------|        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |+ (4) + Redirect for Interaction + + + + + + + + + > |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |<+ (5) +>|      |
|        |                                  |        |  AuthN  |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |<+ (6) +>|      |
|        |                                  |        |  AuthZ  |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |< (7) + Redirect for Continuation + + + + + + + + + +|      |
|        |                                  |        |         +------+
|        |--(8)--- Continue Request ------->|        |
|        |                                  |        |
|        |<-(9)----- Grant Access ----------|        |
|        |                                  |        |
|        |                                  |        |     +--------+
|        |--(10)-- Access API ---------------------------->|   RS   |
|        |                                  |        |     |        |
|        |<-(11)-- API Response ---------------------------|        |
|        |                                  |        |     +--------+
+--------+                                  +--------+

+--------+                                  +--------+         +------+
| Client |                                  |   AS   |         | User |
|Instance|--(1)--- Request Access --------->|        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |<-(2)-- Interaction Needed -------|        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |+ (3) + + Display User Code + + + + + + + + + + + + >|      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |<+ (4) + |      |
|        |                                  |        |Open URI |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |<+ (5) +>|      |
|        |                                  |        |  AuthN  |      |
|        |--(9)--- Continue Request (A) --->|        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |<+ (6) +>|      |
|        |<-(10)- Not Yet Granted (Wait) ---|        |  Code   |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |<+ (7) +>|      |
|        |                                  |        |  AuthZ  |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |<+ (8) +>|      |
|        |                                  |        |Completed|      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |--(11)-- Continue Request (B) --->|        |         +------+
|        |                                  |        |
|        |<-(12)----- Grant Access ---------|        |
|        |                                  |        |
|        |                                  |        |     +--------+
|        |--(13)-- Access API ---------------------------->|   RS   |
|        |                                  |        |     |        |
|        |<-(14)-- API Response ---------------------------|        |
|        |                                  |        |     +--------+
+--------+                                  +--------+

+--------+                                  +--------+         +------+
| Client |                                  |   AS   |         |  RO  |
|Instance|--(1)--- Request Access --------->|        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |<-(2)-- Not Yet Granted (Wait) ---|        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |<+ (3) +>|      |
|        |                                  |        |  AuthN  |      |
|        |--(6)--- Continue Request (A) --->|        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |<+ (4) +>|      |
|        |<-(7)-- Not Yet Granted (Wait) ---|        |  AuthZ  |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |<+ (5) +>|      |
|        |                                  |        |Completed|      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |--(8)--- Continue Request (B) --->|        |         +------+
|        |                                  |        |
|        |<-(9)------ Grant Access ---------|        |
|        |                                  |        |
|        |                                  |        |     +--------+
|        |--(10)-- Access API ---------------------------->|   RS   |
|        |                                  |        |     |        |
|        |<-(11)-- API Response ---------------------------|        |
|        |                                  |        |     +--------+
+--------+                                  +--------+

+--------+                            +--------+
| Client |                            |   AS   |
|Instance|--(1)--- Request Access --->|        |
|        |                            |        |
|        |<-(2)---- Grant Access -----|        |
|        |                            |        |  +--------+
|        |--(3)--- Access API ------------------->|   RS   |
|        |                            |        |  |        |
|        |<-(4)--- API Response ------------------|        |
|        |                            |        |  +--------+
+--------+                            +--------+

+--------+                                          +--------+
| Client |                                          |   AS   |
|Instance|--(1)--- Request Access ----------------->|        |
|        |                                          |        |
|        |<-(2)--- Grant Access --------------------|        |
|        |                                          |        |
|        |                             +--------+   |        |
|        |--(3)--- Access Resource --->|   RS   |   |        |
|        |                             |        |   |        |
|        |<-(4)--- Success Response ---|        |   |        |
|        |                             |        |   |        |
|        |                             |        |   |        |
|        |                             |        |   |        |
|        |--(5)--- Access Resource --->|        |   |        |
|        |                             |        |   |        |
|        |<-(6)--- Error Response -----|        |   |        |
|        |                             +--------+   |        |
|        |                                          |        |
|        |--(7)--- Rotate Token ------------------->|        |
|        |                                          |        |
|        |<-(8)--- Rotated Token -------------------|        |
|        |                                          |        |
+--------+                                          +--------+

+--------+                                  +--------+         +------+
| Client |                                  |   AS   |         | User |
|Instance|                                  |        |         |      |
|        |--(1)--- Request Access --------->|        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |<-(2)-- Interaction Needed -------|        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |+ (3) + Facilitate Interaction + + + + + + + + + + > |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |<+ (4) +>|      |
|        |                                  |        |  AuthN  |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |                                  |        |<+ (5) +>|      |
|        |                                  |        |  AuthZ  |      |
|        |                                  |        |         |      |
|        |< (6) + Signal Continuation + + + + + + + + + + + + +|      |
|        |                                  |        |         +------+
|        |--(7)--- Continue Request ------->|        |
|        |                                  |        |
|        |<-(8)----- Grant Access ----------|        |
|        |                                  |        |
+--------+                                  +--------+

2.1. Requesting Access to Resources

If the client instance is requesting one or more access tokens for the purpose of accessing an API, the client instance MUST include an access_token field. This field MUST be an object (for a single access token (Section 2.1.1)) or an array of these objects (for multiple access tokens (Section 2.1.2)), as described in the following sections.¶

"access_token": {
    "access": [
        {
            "type": "photo-api",
            "actions": [
                "read",
                "write",
                "delete"
            ],
            "locations": [
                "https://server.example.net/",
                "https://resource.local/other"
            ],
            "datatypes": [
                "metadata",
                "images"
            ]
        },
        {
            "type": "walrus-access",
            "actions": [
                "foo",
                "bar"
            ],
            "locations": [
                "https://resource.other/"
            ],
            "datatypes": [
                "data",
                "pictures",
                "walrus whiskers"
            ]
        }
    ],
    "label": "token1-23",
    "flags": [ "split" ]
}

"access_token": [
    {
        "label": "token1",
        "access": [
            {
                "type": "photo-api",
                "actions": [
                    "read",
                    "write",
                    "dolphin"
                ],
                "locations": [
                    "https://server.example.net/",
                    "https://resource.local/other"
                ],
                "datatypes": [
                    "metadata",
                    "images"
                ]
            },
            "dolphin-metadata"
        ]
    },
    {
        "label": "token2",
        "access": [
            {
                "type": "walrus-access",
                "actions": [
                    "foo",
                    "bar"
                ],
                "locations": [
                    "https://resource.other/"
                ],
                "datatypes": [
                    "data",
                    "pictures",
                    "walrus whiskers"
                ]
            }
        ],
        "flags": [ "bearer" ]
    }
]

2.2. Requesting Subject Information

If the client instance is requesting information about the RO from the AS, it sends a subject field as a JSON object. This object MAY contain the following fields (or additional fields defined in a registry TBD (Section 11)).¶

formats (array of strings)

An array of subject identifier subject types requested for the RO, as defined by [I-D.ietf-secevent-subject-identifiers].¶

assertions (array of strings)

An array of requested assertion formats. Possible values include id_token for an [OIDC] ID Token and saml2 for a SAML 2 assertion. Additional assertion values are defined by a registry TBD (Section 11). [[ See issue #41 ]]¶

"subject": {
  "formats": [ "iss_sub", "opaque" ],
  "assertions": [ "id_token", "saml2" ]
}

The AS can determine the RO's identity and permission for releasing this information through interaction with the RO (Section 4), AS policies, or assertions presented by the client instance (Section 2.4). If this is determined positively, the AS MAY return the RO's information in its response (Section 3.4) as requested.¶

Subject identifier types requested by the client instance serve only to identify the RO in the context of the AS and can't be used as communication channels by the client instance, as discussed in Section 3.4.¶

The AS SHOULD NOT re-use subject identifiers for multiple different ROs.¶

Note: the "formats" and "assertions" request fields are independent of each other, and a returned assertion MAY use a different subject identifier.¶

[[ See issue #43 ]]¶

2.3. Identifying the Client Instance

When sending a non-continuation request to the AS, the client instance MUST identify itself by including the client field of the request and by signing the request as described in Section 7.3. Note that for a continuation request (Section 5), the client instance is identified by its association with the request being continued and so this field is not sent under those circumstances.¶

When client instance information is sent by value, the client field of the request consists of a JSON object with the following fields.¶

key (object / string)

The public key of the client instance to be used in this request as described in Section 7.1 or a reference to a key as described in Section 7.1.1. This field is REQUIRED.¶

class_id (string)

An identifier string that the AS can use to identify the client software comprising this client instance. The contents and format of this field are up to the AS. This field is OPTIONAL.¶

display (object)

An object containing additional information that the AS MAY display to the RO during interaction, authorization, and management. This field is OPTIONAL.¶

"client": {
    "key": {
        "proof": "httpsig",
        "jwk": {
                    "kty": "RSA",
                    "e": "AQAB",
                    "kid": "xyz-1",
                    "alg": "RS256",
                    "n": "kOB5rR4Jv0GMeLaY6_It_r3ORwdf8ci_JtffXyaSx8..."
        },
        "cert": "MIIEHDCCAwSgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFA..."
    },
    "class_id": "web-server-1234",
    "display": {
        "name": "My Client Display Name",
        "uri": "https://example.net/client"
    }
}

Additional fields are defined in a registry TBD (Section 11).¶

The client instance MUST prove possession of any presented key by the proof mechanism associated with the key in the request. Proof types are defined in a registry TBD (Section 11) and an initial set of methods is described in Section 7.3.¶

If the same public key is sent by value on different access requests, the AS MUST treat these requests as coming from the same client instance for purposes of identification, authentication, and policy application. If the AS does not know the client instance's public key ahead of time, the AS MAY accept or reject the request based on AS policy, attestations within the client request, and other mechanisms.¶

[[ See issue #44 ]]¶

The client instance MUST NOT send a symmetric key by value in the request, as doing so would expose the key directly instead of simply proving possession of it. See considerations on symmetric keys in Section 12.5.¶

The client instance's key MAY be pre-registered with the AS ahead of time and associated with a set of policies and allowable actions pertaining to that client. If this pre-registration includes other fields that can occur in the client request object described in this section, such as class_id or display, the pre-registered values MUST take precedence over any values given at runtime. Additional fields sent during a request but not present in a pre-registered client instance record at the AS SHOULD NOT be added to the client's pre-registered record. See additional considerations regarding client instance impersonation in Section 12.13.¶

A client instance that is capable of talking to multiple AS's SHOULD use a different key for each AS to prevent a class of mix-up attacks as described in Section 12.27.¶

"client": "client-541-ab"

"display": {
    "name": "My Client Display Name",
    "uri": "https://example.net/client"
}

2.4. Identifying the User

If the client instance knows the identity of the end-user through one or more identifiers or assertions, the client instance MAY send that information to the AS in the "user" field. The client instance MAY pass this information by value or by reference.¶

sub_ids (array of objects)

An array of subject identifiers for the end-user, as defined by [I-D.ietf-secevent-subject-identifiers].¶

assertions (object)

An object containing assertions as values keyed on the assertion type defined by a registry TBD (Section 11). Possible keys include id_token for an [OIDC] ID Token and saml2 for a SAML 2 assertion. The assertion values are the string serialization of the assertion format, encoded as a plain JSON string. Additional assertion types are defined by a registry TBD (Section 11). [[ See issue #41 ]]¶

"user": {
  "sub_ids": [ {
    "format": "opaque",
    "id": "J2G8G8O4AZ"
  } ],
  "assertions": {
    "id_token": "eyj..."
  }
}

Subject identifiers are hints to the AS in determining the RO and MUST NOT be taken as declarative statements that a particular RO is present at the client instance and acting as the end-user. Assertions SHOULD be validated by the AS. [[ See issue #49 ]]¶

If the identified end-user does not match the RO present at the AS during an interaction step, the AS SHOULD reject the request with an error.¶

[[ See issue #50 ]]¶

If the AS trusts the client instance to present verifiable assertions, the AS MAY decide, based on its policy, to skip interaction with the RO, even if the client instance provides one or more interaction modes in its request.¶

See Section 12.26 for considerations that the AS has to make when accepting and processing assertions from the client instance.¶

"user": "XUT2MFM1XBIKJKSDU8QM"

2.5. Interacting with the User

Often, the AS will require interaction with the RO (Section 4) in order to approve a requested delegation to the client instance for both access to resources and direct subject information. Many times the end-user using the client instance is the same person as the RO, and the client instance can directly drive interaction with the end user by facilitating the process through means such as redirection to a URL or launching an application. Other times, the client instance can provide information to start the RO's interaction on a secondary device, or the client instance will wait for the RO to approve the request asynchronously. The client instance could also be signaled that interaction has concluded through a callback mechanism.¶

The client instance declares the parameters for interaction methods that it can support using the interact field.¶

The interact field is a JSON object with three keys whose values declare how the client can initiate and complete the request, as well as provide hints to the AS about user preferences such as locale. A client instance MUST NOT declare an interaction mode it does not support. The client instance MAY send multiple modes in the same request. There is no preference order specified in this request. An AS MAY respond to any, all, or none of the presented interaction modes (Section 3.3) in a request, depending on its capabilities and what is allowed to fulfill the request.¶

start (list of strings/objects)

Indicates how the client instance can start an interaction.¶

finish (object)

Indicates how the client instance can receive an indication that interaction has finished at the AS.¶

hints (object)

Provides additional information to inform the interaction process at the AS.¶

The interact field MUST contain the start key, and MAY contain the finish and hints keys. The value of each key is an array which contains strings or JSON objects as defined below.¶

In this non-normative example, the client instance is indicating that it can redirect (Section 2.5.1.1) the end-user to an arbitrary URL and can receive a redirect (Section 2.5.2.1) through a browser request.¶

"interact": {
    "start": ["redirect"],
    "finish": {
        "method": "redirect",
        "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455",
        "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC"
    }
}

In this non-normative example, the client instance is indicating that it can display a user code (Section 2.5.1.3) and direct the end-user to an arbitrary URL (Section 2.5.1.1) on a secondary device, but it cannot accept a redirect or push callback.¶

"interact": {
    "start": ["redirect", "user_code"]
}

If the client instance does not provide a suitable interaction mechanism, the AS cannot contact the RO asynchronously, and the AS determines that interaction is required, then the AS SHOULD return an error since the client instance will be unable to complete the request without authorization.¶

The AS SHOULD apply suitable timeouts to any interaction mechanisms provided, including user codes and redirection URLs. The client instance SHOULD apply suitable timeouts to any callback URLs.¶

"interact": {
  "start": ["redirect"]
}

"interact": {
  "start": ["app"]
}

"interact": {
    "start": ["user_code"]
}

"interact": {
    "finish": {
        "method": "redirect",
        "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455",
        "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC"
    }
}

"interact": {
    "finish": {
        "method": "push",
        "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455",
        "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC"
    }
}

"interact": {
    "hints": {
        "ui_locales": ["en-US", "fr-CA"]
    }
}

2.6. Extending The Grant Request

The request object MAY be extended by registering new items in a registry TBD (Section 11). Extensions SHOULD be orthogonal to other parameters. Extensions MUST document any aspects where the extension item affects or influences the values or behavior of other request and response objects.¶

3.1. Request Continuation

If the AS determines that the request can be continued with additional requests, it responds with the continue field. This field contains a JSON object with the following properties.¶

uri (string)

REQUIRED. The URI at which the client instance can make continuation requests. This URI MAY vary per request, or MAY be stable at the AS. The client instance MUST use this value exactly as given when making a continuation request (Section 5).¶

wait (integer)

RECOMMENDED. The amount of time in integer seconds the client instance SHOULD wait after receiving this continuation handle and calling the URI.¶

access_token (object)

REQUIRED. A unique access token for continuing the request, called the "continuation access token". The value of this property MUST be in the format specified in Section 3.2.1. This access token MUST be bound to the client instance's key used in the request and MUST NOT be a bearer token. As a consequence, the flags array of this access token MUST NOT contain the string bearer and the key field MUST be omitted. The client instance MUST present the continuation access token in all requests to the continuation URI as described in Section 7.2.¶

{
    "continue": {
        "access_token": {
            "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU"
        },
        "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue",
        "wait": 60
    }
}

The client instance can use the values of this field to continue the request as described in Section 5. Note that the client instance MUST sign all continuation requests with its key as described in Section 7.3 and MUST present the access token in its continuation request.¶

This field SHOULD be returned when interaction is expected, to allow the client instance to follow up after interaction has been concluded.¶

3.2. Access Tokens

If the AS has successfully granted one or more access tokens to the client instance, the AS responds with the access_token field. This field contains either a single access token as described in Section 3.2.1 or an array of access tokens as described in Section 3.2.2.¶

The client instance uses any access tokens in this response to call the RS as described in Section 7.2.¶

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

"access_token": {
    "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0",
    "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\
        M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L",
    "access": [
        {
            "type": "photo-api",
            "actions": [
                "read",
                "write",
                "dolphin"
            ],
            "locations": [
                "https://server.example.net/",
                "https://resource.local/other"
            ],
            "datatypes": [
                "metadata",
                "images"
            ]
        },
        "read", "dolphin-metadata"
    ]
}

"access_token": {
    "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0",
    "flags": ["bearer"],
    "access": [
        "finance", "medical"
    ]
}

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

"access_token": [
    {
        "label": "token1",
        "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0",
        "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\
            M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L",
        "access": [ "finance" ]
    },
    {
        "label": "token2",
        "value": "UFGLO2FDAFG7VGZZPJ3IZEMN21EVU71FHCARP4J1",
        "access": [ "medical" ]
    }
}

"access_token": [
    {
        "label": "split-1",
        "value": "8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219-OS9M2PMHKUR64TBRP1LT0",
        "flags": ["split"],
        "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\
            M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L",
        "access": [ "fruits" ]
    },
    {
        "label": "split-2",
        "value": "FG7VGZZPJ3IZEMN21EVU71FHCAR-UFGLO2FDAP4J1",
        "flags": ["split"],
        "access": [ "vegetables" ]
    }
}

3.3. Interaction Modes

If the client instance has indicated a capability to interact with the RO in its request (Section 2.5), and the AS has determined that interaction is both supported and necessary, the AS responds to the client instance with any of the following values in the interact field of the response. There is no preference order for interaction modes in the response, and it is up to the client instance to determine which ones to use. All supported interaction methods are included in the same interact object.¶

redirect (string)

Redirect to an arbitrary URL. Section 3.3.1¶

app (string)

Launch of an application URL. Section 3.3.2¶

finish (string)

A nonce used by the client instance to verify the callback after interaction is completed. Section 3.3.4¶

user_code (object)

Display a short user code. Section 3.3.3¶

Additional interaction mode responses can be defined in a registry TBD (Section 11).¶

The AS MUST NOT respond with any interaction mode that the client instance did not indicate in its request. The AS MUST NOT respond with any interaction mode that the AS does not support. Since interaction responses include secret or unique information, the AS SHOULD respond to each interaction mode only once in an ongoing request, particularly if the client instance modifies its request (Section 5.3).¶

"interact": {
    "redirect": "https://interact.example.com/4CF492MLVMSW9MKMXKHQ"
}

"interact": {
    "app": "https://app.example.com/launch?tx=4CF492MLV"
}

"interact": {
    "user_code": {
        "code": "A1BC-3DFF",
        "url": "https://srv.ex/device"
    }
}

"interact": {
    "finish": "MBDOFXG4Y5CVJCX821LH"
}

3.4. Returning Subject Information

If information about the RO is requested and the AS grants the client instance access to that data, the AS returns the approved information in the "subject" response field. The AS MUST return the subject field only in cases where the AS is sure that the RO and the end-user are the same party. This can be accomplished through some forms of interaction with the RO (Section 4).¶

This field is an object with the following OPTIONAL properties.¶

sub_ids (array of objects)

An array of subject identifiers for the RO, as defined by [I-D.ietf-secevent-subject-identifiers].¶

An object containing assertions as values keyed on the assertion type defined by a registry TBD (Section 11). Possible keys include id_token for an [OIDC] ID Token and saml2 for a SAML 2 assertion. The assertion values are the string serialization of the assertion format, encoded as a plain JSON string. Additional assertion types are defined by a registry TBD (Section 11). [[ See issue #41 ]]¶

updated_at (string)

Timestamp as an ISO8610 date string, indicating when the identified account was last updated. The client instance MAY use this value to determine if it needs to request updated profile information through an identity API. The definition of such an identity API is out of scope for this specification.¶

"subject": {
  "sub_ids": [ {
    "format": "opaque",
    "id": "XUT2MFM1XBIKJKSDU8QM"
  } ],
  "assertions": {
    "id_token": "eyj..."
  }
}

Subject identifiers returned by the AS SHOULD uniquely identify the RO at the AS. Some forms of subject identifier are opaque to the client instance (such as the subject of an issuer and subject pair), while others forms (such as email address and phone number) are intended to allow the client instance to correlate the identifier with other account information at the client instance. The AS MUST ensure that the returned subject identifiers only apply to the authenticated end user. The client instance MUST NOT request or use any returned subject identifiers for communication purposes (see Section 2.2). That is, a subject identifier returned in the format of an email address or a phone number only identifies the RO to the AS and does not indicate that the AS has validated that the represented email address or phone number in the identifier is suitable for communication with the current user. To get such information, the client instance MUST use an identity protocol to request and receive additional identity claims. The details of an identity protocol and associated schema are outside the scope of this specification.¶

Extensions to this specification MAY define additional response properties in a registry TBD (Section 11).¶

See Section 12.26 for considerations that the client instance has to make when accepting and processing assertions from the AS.¶

3.5. Returning a Dynamically-bound Client Instance Identifier

Many parts of the client instance's request can be passed as either a value or a reference. The use of a reference in place of a value allows for a client instance to optimize requests to the AS.¶

Some references, such as for the client instance's identity (Section 2.3.1) or the requested resources (Section 8.1), can be managed statically through an admin console or developer portal provided by the AS or RS. The developer of the client software can include these values in their code for a more efficient and compact request.¶

If desired, the AS MAY also generate and return an instance identifier dynamically to the client instance in the response to facilitate multiple interactions with the same client instance over time. The client instance SHOULD use this instance identifier in future requests in lieu of sending the associated data values in the client field.¶

Dynamically generated client instance identifiers are string values that MUST be protected by the client instance as secrets. Instance identifier values MUST be unguessable and MUST NOT contain any sensitive information. Instance identifier values are opaque to the client instance.¶

instance_id (string)

A string value used to represent the information in the client object that the client instance can use in a future request, as described in Section 2.3.1.¶

This non-normative example shows an instance identifier along side an issued access token.¶

{
    "instance_id": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO",
    "access_token": {
        "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0"
    }
}

[[ See issue #77 ]]¶

[[ See issue #78 ]]¶

3.6. Error Response

If the AS determines that the request cannot be issued for any reason, it responds to the client instance with an error message.¶

error (string)

The error code.¶

{

  "error": "user_denied"

}

The error code is one of the following, with additional values available in a registry TBD (Section 11):¶

user_denied

The RO denied the request.¶

too_fast

The client instance did not respect the timeout in the wait response.¶

unknown_request

The request referenced an unknown ongoing access request.¶

[[ See issue #79 ]]¶

3.7. Extending the Response

Extensions to this specification MAY define additional fields for the grant response in a registry TBD (Section 11).¶

4.1. Interaction Start Methods

To initiate an interaction start method indicated by the interaction start responses (Section 3.3) from the AS, the client instance follows the steps defined by that interaction method. The actions of the client instance required for the interaction start modes defined in this specification are described in the following sections.¶

4.2. Post-Interaction Completion

If an interaction "finish" (Section 3.3.4) method is associated with the current request, the AS MUST follow the appropriate method at upon completion of interaction in order to signal the client instance to continue, except for some limited error cases discussed below. If a finish method is not available, the AS SHOULD instruct the RO to return to the client instance upon completion.¶

The AS MUST create an interaction reference and associate that reference with the current interaction and the underlying pending request. This interaction reference value MUST be sufficiently random so as not to be guessable by an attacker. The interaction reference MUST be one-time-use to prevent interception and replay attacks.¶

The AS MUST calculate a hash value based on the client instance and AS nonces and the interaction reference, as described in Section 4.2.3. The client instance will use this value to validate the "finish" call.¶

The AS MUST send the hash and interaction reference based on the interaction finish mode as described in the following sections.¶

Note that the "finish" method still occurs in many error cases, such as when the RO has denied access. This pattern allows the client instance to potentially recover from the error state by modifying its request or providing additional information directly to the AS in a continuation request. The AS MUST NOT follow the "finish" method in the following circumstances:¶

• The AS has determined that any URIs involved with the finish method are dangerous or blocked.¶
• The AS cannot determine which ongoing grant request is being referenced.¶
• The ongoing grant request has been cancelled or otherwise blocked.¶

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

https://client.example.net/return/123455\
  ?hash=p28jsq0Y2KK3WS__a42tavNC64ldGTBroywsWxT4md_jZQ1R2\
    HZT8BOWYHcLmObM7XHPAdJzTZMtKBsaraJ64A\
  &interact_ref=4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

POST /push/554321 HTTP/1.1
Host: client.example.net
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "hash": "p28jsq0Y2KK3WS__a42tavNC64ldGTBroywsWxT4md_jZQ1R\
    2HZT8BOWYHcLmObM7XHPAdJzTZMtKBsaraJ64A",
  "interact_ref": "4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1"
}

VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO
MBDOFXG4Y5CVJCX821LH
4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1
https://server.example.com/tx

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

p28jsq0Y2KK3WS__a42tavNC64ldGTBroywsWxT4md_jZQ1R2HZT8BOWYHcLmObM\
  7XHPAdJzTZMtKBsaraJ64A

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

62SbcD3Xs7L40rjgALA-ymQujoh2LB2hPJyX9vlcr1H6ecChZ8BNKkG_HrOKP_Bp\
  j84rh4mC9aE9x7HPBFcIHw

5.1. Continuing After a Completed Interaction

When the AS responds to the client instance's finish method as in Section 4.2.1, this response includes an interaction reference. The client instance MUST include that value as the field interact_ref in a POST request to the continuation URI.¶

POST /continue HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...
Digest: sha256=...

{
  "interact_ref": "4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1"
}

Since the interaction reference is a one-time-use value as described in Section 4.2.1, if the client instance needs to make additional continuation calls after this request, the client instance MUST NOT include the interaction reference. If the AS detects a client instance submitting the same interaction reference multiple times, the AS MUST return an error and SHOULD invalidate the ongoing request.¶

The grant response (Section 3) MAY contain any newly-created access tokens (Section 3.2) or newly-released subject claims (Section 3.4). The response MAY contain a new "continue" response (Section 3.1) as described above. The response SHOULD NOT contain any interaction responses (Section 3.3). [[ See issue #89 ]]¶

For example, if the request is successful in causing the AS to issue access tokens and release opaque subject claims, the response could look like this:¶

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

{
    "access_token": {
        "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0",
        "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\
            M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L",
    },
    "subject": {
        "sub_ids": [ {
          "format": "opaque",
          "id": "J2G8G8O4AZ"
        } ]
    }
}

With this example, the client instance can not make an additional continuation request because a continue field is not included.¶

[[ See issue #88 ]]¶

5.2. Continuing During Pending Interaction

When the client instance does not include a finish parameter, the client instance will often need to poll the AS until the RO has authorized the request. To do so, the client instance makes a POST request to the continuation URI as in Section 5.1, but does not include a message body.¶

POST /continue HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...

The grant response (Section 3) MAY contain any newly-created access tokens (Section 3.2) or newly-released subject claims (Section 3.4). The response MAY contain a new "continue" response (Section 3.1) as described above. If a continue field is included, it SHOULD include a wait field to facilitate a reasonable polling rate by the client instance. The response SHOULD NOT contain interaction responses (Section 3.3).¶

For example, if the request has not yet been authorized by the RO, the AS could respond by telling the client instance to make another continuation request in the future. In this example, a new, unique access token has been issued for the call, which the client instance will use in its next continuation request.¶

{
    "continue": {
        "access_token": {
            "value": "33OMUKMKSKU80UPRY5NM"
        },
        "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue",
        "wait": 30
    }
}

[[ See issue #90 ]]¶

[[ See issue #91 ]]¶

If the request is successful in causing the AS to issue access tokens and release subject claims, the response could look like this example:¶

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

{
    "access_token": {
        "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0",
        "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\
            M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L",
    },
    "subject": {
        "sub_ids": [ {
          "format": "opaque",
          "id": "J2G8G8O4AZ"
        } ]
    }
}

See Section 12.21 for considerations on polling for continuation without an interaction finish method.¶

5.3. Modifying an Existing Request

The client instance might need to modify an ongoing request, whether or not tokens have already been issued or claims have already been released. In such cases, the client instance makes an HTTP PATCH request to the continuation URI and includes any fields it needs to modify. Fields that aren't included in the request are considered unchanged from the original request.¶

The client instance MAY include the access_token and subject fields as described in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2. Inclusion of these fields override any values in the initial request, which MAY trigger additional requirements and policies by the AS. For example, if the client instance is asking for more access, the AS could require additional interaction with the RO to gather additional consent. If the client instance is asking for more limited access, the AS could determine that sufficient authorization has been granted to the client instance and return the more limited access rights immediately. [[ See issue #92 ]]¶

The client instance MAY include the interact field as described in Section 2.5. Inclusion of this field indicates that the client instance is capable of driving interaction with the RO, and this field replaces any values from a previous request. The AS MAY respond to any of the interaction responses as described in Section 3.3, just like it would to a new request.¶

The client instance MAY include the user field as described in Section 2.4 to present new assertions or information about the end-user. [[ See issue #93 ]]¶

The client instance MUST NOT include the client section of the request. [[ See issue #94 ]]¶

The client instance MAY include post-interaction responses such as described in Section 5.1. [[ See issue #95 ]]¶

Modification requests MUST NOT alter previously-issued access tokens. Instead, any access tokens issued from a continuation are considered new, separate access tokens. The AS MAY revoke existing access tokens after a modification has occurred. [[ See issue #96 ]]¶

If the modified request can be granted immediately by the AS, the grant response (Section 3) MAY contain any newly-created access tokens (Section 3.2) or newly-released subject claims (Section 3.4). The response MAY contain a new "continue" response (Section 3.1) as described above. If interaction can occur, the response SHOULD contain interaction responses (Section 3.3) as well.¶

For example, a client instance initially requests a set of resources using references:¶

POST /tx HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...
Digest: sha256=...

{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            "read", "write"
        ]
    },
    "interact": {
        "start": ["redirect"],
        "finish": {
            "method": "redirect",
            "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455",
            "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC"
        }
    },
    "client": "987YHGRT56789IOLK"
}

Access is granted by the RO, and a token is issued by the AS. In its final response, the AS includes a continue field, which includes a separate access token for accessing the continuation API:¶

{
    "continue": {
        "access_token": {
            "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU"
        },
        "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue",
        "wait": 30
    },
    "access_token": {
        "value": "RP1LT0-OS9M2P_R64TB",
        "access": [
            "read", "write"
        ]
    }
}

This continue field allows the client instance to make an eventual continuation call. In the future, the client instance realizes that it no longer needs "write" access and therefore modifies its ongoing request, here asking for just "read" access instead of both "read" and "write" as before.¶

PATCH /continue HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...
Digest: sha256=...

{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            "read"
        ]
    }
    ...
}

The AS replaces the previous access from the first request, allowing the AS to determine if any previously-granted consent already applies. In this case, the AS would likely determine that reducing the breadth of the requested access means that new access tokens can be issued to the client instance. The AS would likely revoke previously-issued access tokens that had the greater access rights associated with them, unless they had been issued with the durable flag.¶

{
    "continue": {
        "access_token": {
            "value": "M33OMUK80UPRY5NMKSKU"
        },
        "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue",
        "wait": 30
    },
    "access_token": {
        "value": "0EVKC7-2ZKwZM_6N760",
        "access": [
            "read"
        ]
    }
}

For another example, the client instance initially requests read-only access but later needs to step up its access. The initial request could look like this example.¶

POST /tx HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...
Digest: sha256=...

{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            "read"
        ]
    },
    "interact": {
        "start": ["redirect"],
        "finish": {
            "method": "redirect",
            "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455",
            "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC"
        }
    },
    "client": "987YHGRT56789IOLK"
}

Access is granted by the RO, and a token is issued by the AS. In its final response, the AS includes a continue field:¶

{
    "continue": {
        "access_token": {
            "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU"
        },
        "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue",
        "wait": 30
    },
    "access_token": {
        "value": "RP1LT0-OS9M2P_R64TB",
        "access": [
            "read"
        ]
    }
}

This allows the client instance to make an eventual continuation call. The client instance later realizes that it now needs "write" access in addition to the "read" access. Since this is an expansion of what it asked for previously, the client instance also includes a new interaction section in case the AS needs to interact with the RO again to gather additional authorization. Note that the client instance's nonce and callback are different from the initial request. Since the original callback was already used in the initial exchange, and the callback is intended for one-time-use, a new one needs to be included in order to use the callback again.¶

[[ See issue #97 ]]¶

PATCH /continue HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...
Digest: sha256=...

{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            "read", "write"
        ]
    },
    "interact": {
        "start": ["redirect"],
        "finish": {
            "method": "redirect",
            "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/654321",
            "nonce": "K82FX4T4LKLTI25DQFZC"
        }
    }
}

From here, the AS can determine that the client instance is asking for more than it was previously granted, but since the client instance has also provided a mechanism to interact with the RO, the AS can use that to gather the additional consent. The protocol continues as it would with a new request. Since the old access tokens are good for a subset of the rights requested here, the AS might decide to not revoke them. However, any access tokens granted after this update process are new access tokens and do not modify the rights of existing access tokens.¶

5.4. Canceling a Grant Request

If the client instance wishes to cancel an ongoing grant request, it makes an HTTP DELETE request to the continuation URI.¶

DELETE /continue HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...

If the request is successfully cancelled, the AS responds with an HTTP 202. The AS SHOULD revoke all associated access tokens.¶

6.1. Rotating the Access Token

The client instance makes an HTTP POST to the token management URI, sending the access token in the appropriate header and signing the request with the appropriate key.¶

POST /token/PRY5NM33OM4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: GNAP OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...
Digest: sha256=...

The AS validates that the token presented is associated with the management URL, that the AS issued the token to the given client instance, and that the presented key is appropriate to the token.¶

If the access token has expired, the AS SHOULD honor the rotation request to the token management URL since it is likely that the client instance is attempting to refresh the expired token. To support this, the AS MAY apply different lifetimes for the use of the token in management vs. its use at an RS. An AS MUST NOT honor a rotation request for an access token that has been revoked, either by the AS or by the client instance through the token management URI (Section 6.2).¶

If the token is validated and the key is appropriate for the request, the AS MUST invalidate the current access token associated with this URL, if possible, and return a new access token response as described in Section 3.2.1, unless the multi_token flag is specified in the request. The value of the access token MUST NOT be the same as the current value of the access token used to access the management API. The response MAY include an updated access token management URL as well, and if so, the client instance MUST use this new URL to manage the new access token. [[ See issue #101 ]]¶

[[ See issue #102 ]]¶

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

{
    "access_token": {
        "value": "FP6A8H6HY37MH13CK76LBZ6Y1UADG6VEUPEER5H2",
        "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\
            M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L",
        "access": [
            {
                "type": "photo-api",
                "actions": [
                    "read",
                    "write",
                    "dolphin"
                ],
                "locations": [
                    "https://server.example.net/",
                    "https://resource.local/other"
                ],
                "datatypes": [
                    "metadata",
                    "images"
                ]
            },
            "read", "dolphin-metadata"
        ]
    }
}

[[ See issue #103 ]]¶

6.2. Revoking the Access Token

If the client instance wishes to revoke the access token proactively, such as when a user indicates to the client instance that they no longer wish for it to have access or the client instance application detects that it is being uninstalled, the client instance can use the token management URI to indicate to the AS that the AS should invalidate the access token for all purposes.¶

The client instance makes an HTTP DELETE request to the token management URI, presenting the access token and signing the request with the appropriate key.¶

DELETE /token/PRY5NM33OM4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: GNAP OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...

If the key presented is associated with the token (or the client instance, in the case of a bearer token), the AS MUST invalidate the access token, if possible, and return an HTTP 204 response code.¶

204 No Content

Though the AS MAY revoke an access token at any time for any reason, the token management function is specifically for the client instance's use. If the access token has already expired or has been revoked through other means, the AS SHOULD honor the revocation request to the token management URL as valid, since the end result is still the token not being usable.¶

7.1. Key Formats

Several different places in GNAP require the presentation of key material by value. Proof of this key material MUST be bound to a request, the nature of which varies with the location in the protocol the key is used. For a key used as part of a client instance's initial request in Section 2.3, the key value is the client instance's public key, and proof of that key MUST be presented in that request. For a key used as part of an access token response in Section 3.2.1, the proof of that key MUST be used when presenting the access token.¶

A key presented by value MUST be a public key in at least one supported format. If a key is sent in multiple formats, all the key format values MUST be equivalent. Note that while most formats present the full value of the public key, some formats present a value cryptographically derived from the public key.¶

proof (string)

The form of proof that the client instance will use when presenting the key. The valid values of this field and the processing requirements for each are detailed in Section 7.3. The proof field is REQUIRED.¶

jwk (object)

The public key and its properties represented as a JSON Web Key [RFC7517]. A JWK MUST contain the alg (Algorithm) and kid (Key ID) parameters. The alg parameter MUST NOT be "none". The x5c (X.509 Certificate Chain) parameter MAY be used to provide the X.509 representation of the provided public key.¶

cert (string)

PEM serialized value of the certificate used to sign the request, with optional internal whitespace per [RFC7468]. The PEM header and footer are optionally removed.¶

cert#S256 (string)

The certificate thumbprint calculated as per OAuth-MTLS [RFC8705] in base64 URL encoding. Note that this format does not include the full public key.¶

Additional key formats are defined in a registry TBD (Section 11).¶

This non-normative example shows a single key presented in multiple formats. This example key is intended to be used with the HTTP Message Signatures proofing mechanism, as indicated by the httpsig value of the proof field.¶

"key": {
    "proof": "httpsig",
    "jwk": {
                "kty": "RSA",
                "e": "AQAB",
                "kid": "xyz-1",
                "alg": "RS256",
                "n": "kOB5rR4Jv0GMeLaY6_It_r3ORwdf8ci_JtffXyaSx8xY..."
    },
    "cert": "MIIEHDCCAwSgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFA..."
}

    "key": "S-P4XJQ_RYJCRTSU1.63N3E"

7.2. Presenting Access Tokens

The method the client instance uses to send an access token depends on whether the token is bound to a key, and if so which proofing method is associated with the key. This information is conveyed by the key parameter and the bearer flag in the single (Section 3.2.1) and multiple access tokens (Section 3.2.2) responses.¶

If the flags field does not contain the bearer flag and the key is absent, the access token MUST be sent using the same key and proofing mechanism that the client instance used in its initial request (or its most recent rotation).¶

If the flags field does not contain the bearer flag and the key value is an object as described in Section 7.1, the access token MUST be sent using the key and proofing mechanism defined by the value of the proof field within the key object.¶

The access token MUST be sent using the HTTP "Authorization" request header field and the "GNAP" authorization scheme along with a key proof as described in Section 7.3 for the key bound to the access token. For example, an "httpsig"-bound access token is sent as follows:¶

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

GET /stuff HTTP/1.1
Host: resource.example.com
Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU
Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@target-uri" "authorization")\
  ;created=1618884475;keyid="gnap-rsa"
Signature: sig1=:KymTn1/++nwWsNHdc48sguMjnVSnvqQNrijQT0/kXDfljaIgHl\
  o12NkEt4e5qZeCFutzRxWpHKtjVEDldIUSsktxj4Li7PgUNJtIkJkdA1EoebGz1X/\
  AD3coqYpoaFsOcPyfXjYHYWFd8HxLOUz3imA8xbxS+J9GZAjyDjTfG6yfsMsfd10f\
  nrDRJqalPNDEgOOwwyEtjht4MnzpV1Wf43YWwgEJOC2rvxPIeuNxWbUc5v/o3s3Zr\
  ywo2sunUcwXwlmbgyiGY0vgGFWjdHfgKvjda7eNLTr7r3jPgo/GlOB3jyadD4xcKs\
  S/idS3RGk1+e9jbGHK5cRTp0ZzF94kWw==:

If the flags field contains the bearer flag, the access token is a bearer token that MUST be sent using the Authorization Request Header Field method defined in [RFC6750].¶

Authorization: Bearer OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0

The Form-Encoded Body Parameter and URI Query Parameter methods of [RFC6750] MUST NOT be used.¶

[[ See issue #104 ]]¶

The client software MUST reject as an error a situation where the flags field contains the bearer flag and the key field is present with any value.¶

7.3. Proving Possession of a Key with a Request

Any keys presented by the client instance to the AS or RS MUST be validated as part of the request in which they are presented. The type of binding used is indicated by the proof parameter of the key object in Section 7.1. Values defined by this specification are as follows:¶

httpsig

HTTP Signing signature header¶

mtls

Mutual TLS certificate verification¶

jwsd

A detached JWS signature header¶

jws

Attached JWS payload¶

Additional proofing methods are defined by a registry TBD (Section 11).¶

All key binding methods used by this specification MUST cover all relevant portions of the request, including anything that would change the nature of the request, to allow for secure validation of the request. Relevant aspects include the URI being called, the HTTP method being used, any relevant HTTP headers and values, and the HTTP message body itself. The verifier of the signed message MUST validate all components of the signed message to ensure that nothing has been tampered with or substituted in a way that would change the nature of the request. Key binding method definitions SHOULD enumerate how these requirements are fulfilled.¶

When a key proofing mechanism is bound to an access token, the key being presented MUST be the key associated with the access token and the access token MUST be covered by the signature method of the proofing mechanism.¶

The key binding methods in this section MAY be used by other components making calls as part of GNAP, such as the extensions allowing the RS to make calls to the AS defined in [I-D.ietf-gnap-resource-servers]. To facilitate this extended use, the sections below are defined in generic terms of the "signer" and "verifier" of the HTTP message. In the core functions of GNAP, the "signer" is the client instance and the "verifier" is the AS or RS, as appropriate.¶

When used for delegation in GNAP, these key binding mechanisms allow the AS to ensure that the keys presented by the client instance in the initial request are in control of the party calling any follow-up or continuation requests. To facilitate this requirement, the continuation response (Section 3.1) includes an access token bound to the client instance's key (Section 2.3), and that key (or its most recent rotation) MUST be proved in all continuation requests Section 5. Token management requests Section 6 are similarly bound to either the access token's own key or, in the case of bearer tokens, the client instance's key.¶

[[ See issue #105 ]]¶

In the following sections, unless otherwise noted, the RS256 JOSE Signature Algorithm is applied using the following RSA key (presented here in JWK format):¶

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

{
    "kid": "gnap-rsa",
    "p": "xS4-YbQ0SgrsmcA7xDzZKuVNxJe3pCYwdAe6efSy4hdDgF9-vhC5gjaRk\
        i1wWuERSMW4Tv44l5HNrL-Bbj_nCJxr_HAOaesDiPn2PnywwEfg3Nv95Nn-\
        eilhqXRaW-tJKEMjDHu_fmJBeemHNZI412gBnXdGzDVo22dvYoxd6GM",
    "kty": "RSA",
    "q": "rVdcT_uy-CD0GKVLGpEGRR7k4JO6Tktc8MEHkC6NIFXihk_6vAIOCzCD6\
        LMovMinOYttpRndKoGTNdJfWlDFDScAs8C5n2y1STCQPRximBY-bw39-aZq\
        JXMxOLyPjzuVgiTOCBIvLD6-8-mvFjXZk_eefD0at6mQ5qV3U1jZt88",
    "d": "FHlhdTF0ozTliDxMBffT6aJVKZKmbbFJOVNten9c3lXKB3ux3NAb_D2dB\
        7inp9EV23oWrDspFtvCvD9dZrXgRKMHofkEpo_SSvBZfgtH-OTkbY_TqtPF\
        FLPKAw0JX5cFPnn4Q2xE4n-dQ7tpRCKl59vZLHBrHShr90zqzFp0AKXU5fj\
        b1gC9LPwsFA2Fd7KXmI1drQQEVq9R-o18Pnn4BGQNQNjO_VkcJTiBmEIVT_\
        KJRPdpVJAmbgnYWafL_hAfeb_dK8p85yurEVF8nCK5oO3EPrqB7IL4UqaEn\
        5Sl3u0j8x5or-xrrAoNz-gdOv7ONfZY6NFoa-3f8q9wBAHUuQ",
    "e": "AQAB",
    "qi": "ogpNEkDKg22Rj9cDV_-PJBZaXMk66Fp557RT1tafIuqJRHEufSOYnsto\
        bWPJ0gHxv1gVJw3gm-zYvV-wTMNgr2wVsBSezSJjPSjxWZtmT2z68W1DuvK\
        kZy15vz7Jd85hmDlriGcXNCoFEUsGLWkpHH9RwPIzguUHWmTt8y0oXyI",
    "dp": "dvCKGI2G7RLh3WyjoJ_Dr6hZ3LhXweB3YcY3qdD9BnxZ71mrLiMQg4c_\
        EBnwqCETN_5sStn2cRc2JXnvLP3G8t7IFKHTT_i_TSTacJ7uT04MSa053Y3\
        RfwbvLjRNPR0UKAE3ZxROUoIaVNuU_6-QMf8-2ilUv2GIOrCN87gP_Vk",
    "alg": "RS256",
    "dq": "iMZmELaKgT9_W_MRT-UfDWtTLeFjIGRW8aFeVmZk9R7Pnyt8rNzyN-IQ\
        M40ql8u8J6vc2GmQGfokLlPQ6XLSCY68_xkTXrhoU1f-eDntkhP7L6XawSK\
        Onv5F2H7wyBQ75HUmHTg8AK2B_vRlMyFKjXbVlzKf4kvqChSGEz4IjQ",
    "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8BfYdHsFzAt\
        YKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZGYX\
        jHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZx\
        e0jRETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0\
        bunS0K3bA_3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kO\
        zywzwPTuq-cVQDyEN7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQ"
}

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            "dolphin-metadata"
        ]
    },
    "interact": {
        "start": ["redirect"],
        "finish": {
            "method": "redirect",
            "uri": "https://client.foo/callback",
            "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO"
        }
    },
    "client": {
      "proof": "httpsig",
      "key": {
        "jwk": {
            "kid": "gnap-rsa",
            "kty": "RSA",
            "e": "AQAB",
            "alg": "RS256",
            "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8Bf\
  YdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZG\
  YXjHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jR\
  ETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0bunS0K3bA_\
  3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kOzywzwPTuq-cVQDyE\
  N7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQ"
        }
      }
      "display": {
        "name": "My Client Display Name",
        "uri": "https://client.foo/"
      },
    }
}

id-sha-256=98QzyNVYpdgTrWBKpC4qFSCmmR+CrwwvUoiaDCSjKxw=

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

"@method": POST
"@target-uri": https://server.example.com/gnap
"content-type": application/json
"content-digest": id-sha-256=98QzyNVYpdgTrWBKpC4qFSCmmR+Crwwv\
  UoiaDCSjKxw=
"content-length": 986
"@signature-params": ("@method" "@target-uri" "content-type" \
  "content-digest" "content-length");created=1618884475\
  ;keyid="gnap-rsa"

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

POST /gnap HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 986
Content-Digest: id-sha-256=98QzyNVYpdgTrWBKpC4qFSCmmR+CrwwvUoiaDCSj\
  Kxw=
Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@target-uri" "content-type" \
  "content-digest" "content-length");created=1618884475\
  ;keyid="gnap-rsa"
Signature: sig1=:SatKrAh2qNxbDBY6H3XUtpWn07aSrukpi3202L4DIPLLGgKdSu\
  XyObjdCK/agmEx36xyn40iiCAqYskXugpNARianBiWKOkcWHhSs31FSTSoJ8vvGpJ\
  4GxemDPvI6BXmLZtJvYBehoXtfcRFKGLzYOtbbtefzw2vP+k19W4PrhNmxFEUCepT\
  KRk0sBoz4zIYK6FqEAHir0oRjwdCcXHFqI9U6+/DgpuxjFFX+OSZehmN6Q1quJgu0\
  FITmsC9OANs5hwIAkXGJNdv3FuxAZAVrSnUScuGutSJXAn1daXToewVgBA+IrQ86m\
  lsXtWgvmTTXENUvOELV6qTV2nenwr/UQ==:


{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            "dolphin-metadata"
        ]
    },
    "interact": {
        "start": ["redirect"],
        "finish": {
            "method": "redirect",
            "uri": "https://client.foo/callback",
            "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO"
        }
    },
    "client": {
      "proof": "httpsig",
      "key": {
        "jwk": {
            "kid": "gnap-rsa",
            "kty": "RSA",
            "e": "AQAB",
            "alg": "RS256",
            "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8Bf\
  YdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZG\
  YXjHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jR\
  ETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0bunS0K3bA_\
  3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kOzywzwPTuq-cVQDyE\
  N7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQ"
        }
      }
      "display": {
        "name": "My Client Display Name",
        "uri": "https://client.foo/"
      },
    }
}

POST /gnap HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/jose
Content-Length: 1567
Client-Cert: \
  :MIIC6jCCAdKgAwIBAgIGAXjw74xPMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMDYxNDAyBgNVBAMM\
  K05JWU15QmpzRGp5QkM5UDUzN0Q2SVR6a3BEOE50UmppOXlhcEV6QzY2bVEwHhcN\
  MjEwNDIwMjAxODU0WhcNMjIwMjE0MjAxODU0WjA2MTQwMgYDVQQDDCtOSVlNeUJq\
  c0RqeUJDOVA1MzdENklUemtwRDhOdFJqaTl5YXBFekM2Nm1RMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG\
  9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAhYOJ+XOKISdMMShn/G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBB\
  kI2cmRt4Ai8BfYdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8I\
  kZ8NMwSrcUIBZGYXjHpwjzvfGvXH/5KJlnR3/uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE4\
  1hqaPUnhRZxe0jRETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo+\
  uv4BC0bunS0K3bA/3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp/muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3k\
  OzywzwPTuq+cVQDyEN7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQIDAQABMA0GCSqG\
  SIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBnYFK0eYHy+hVf2D58usj39lhL5znb/q9G35GBd/XsWfCE\
  wHuLOSZSUmG71bZtrOcx0ptle9bp2kKl4HlSTTfbtpuG5onSa3swRNhtKtUy5NH9\
  W/FLViKWfoPS3kwoEpC1XqKY6l7evoTCtS+kTQRSrCe4vbNprCAZRxz6z1nEeCgu\
  NMk38yTRvx8ihZpVOuU+Ih+dOtVe/ex5IAPYxlQsvtfhsUZqc7IyCcy72WHnRHlU\
  fn3pJm0S5270+Yls3Iv6h3oBAP19i906UjiUTNH3g0xMW+V4uLxgyckt4wD4Mlyv\
  jnaQ7Z3sR6EsXMocAbXHIAJhwKdtU/fLgdwL5vtx:


{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            "dolphin-metadata"
        ]
    },
    "interact": {
        "start": ["redirect"],
        "finish": {
            "method": "redirect",
            "uri": "https://client.foo/callback",
            "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO"
        }
    },
    "client": {
      "proof": "jws",
      "key": {
        "cert": "MIIC6jCCAdKgAwIBAgIGAXjw74xPMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMD\
  YxNDAyBgNVBAMMK05JWU15QmpzRGp5QkM5UDUzN0Q2SVR6a3BEOE50UmppOXlhcEV\
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  guNMk38yTRvx8ihZpVOuU+Ih+dOtVe/ex5IAPYxlQsvtfhsUZqc7IyCcy72WHnRHl\
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  jnaQ7Z3sR6EsXMocAbXHIAJhwKdtU/fLgdwL5vtx"
      }
      "display": {
        "name": "My Client Display Name",
        "uri": "https://client.foo/"
      },
    },
    "subject": {
        "formats": ["iss_sub", "opaque"]
    }
}

{
    "alg": "RS256",
    "kid": "gnap-rsa",
    "uri": "https://server.example.com/gnap",
    "htm": "POST",
    "typ": "gnap-binding+jwsd",
    "created": 1618884475
}

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            "dolphin-metadata"
        ]
    },
    "interact": {
        "start": ["redirect"],
        "finish": {
            "method": "redirect",
            "uri": "https://client.foo/callback",
            "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO"
        }
    },
    "client": {
      "proof": "jwsd",
      "key": {
        "jwk": {
            "kid": "gnap-rsa",
            "kty": "RSA",
            "e": "AQAB",
            "alg": "RS256",
            "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8Bf\
  YdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZG\
  YXjHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jR\
  ETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0bunS0K3bA_\
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  N7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQ"
        }
      }
      "display": {
        "name": "My Client Display Name",
        "uri": "https://client.foo/"
      },
    }
}

PGiVuOZUcN1tRtUS6tx2b4cBgw9mPgXG3IPB3wY7ctc

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

POST /gnap HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 983
Detached-JWS: eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImNyZWF0ZWQiOjE2MTg4ODQ0NzUsImh0b\
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  ZUcN1tRtUS6tx2b4cBgw9mPgXG3IPB3wY7ctc.fUq-SV-A1iFN2MwCRW_yolVtT2_\
  TZA2h5YeXUoi5F2Q2iToC0Tc4drYFOSHIX68knd68RUA7yHqCVP-ZQEd6aL32H69e\
  9zuMiw6O_s4TBKB3vDOvwrhYtDH6fX2hP70cQoO-47OwbqP-ifkrvI3hVgMX9TfjV\
  eKNwnhoNnw3vbu7SNKeqJEbbwZfpESaGepS52xNBlDNMYBQQXxM9OqKJaXffzLFEl\
  -Xe0UnfolVtBraz3aPrPy1C6a4uT7wLda3PaTOVtgysxzii3oJWpuz0WP5kRujzDF\
  wX_EOzW0jsjCSkL-PXaKSpZgEjNjKDMg9irSxUISt1C1T6q3SzRgfuQ


{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            "dolphin-metadata"
        ]
    },
    "interact": {
        "start": ["redirect"],
        "finish": {
            "method": "redirect",
            "uri": "https://client.foo/callback",
            "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO"
        }
    },
    "client": {
      "proof": "jwsd",
      "key": {
        "jwk": {
            "kid": "gnap-rsa",
            "kty": "RSA",
            "e": "AQAB",
            "alg": "RS256",
            "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8Bf\
  YdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZG\
  YXjHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jR\
  ETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0bunS0K3bA_\
  3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kOzywzwPTuq-cVQDyE\
  N7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQ"
        }
      }
      "display": {
        "name": "My Client Display Name",
        "uri": "https://client.foo/"
      },
    }
}

{
    "alg": "RS256",
    "kid": "gnap-rsa",
    "uri": "https://server.example.com/gnap",
    "htm": "POST",
    "typ": "gnap-binding+jwsd",
    "created": 1618884475
}

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            "dolphin-metadata"
        ]
    },
    "interact": {
        "start": ["redirect"],
        "finish": {
            "method": "redirect",
            "uri": "https://client.foo/callback",
            "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO"
        }
    },
    "client": {
      "proof": "jws",
      "key": {
        "jwk": {
            "kid": "gnap-rsa",
            "kty": "RSA",
            "e": "AQAB",
            "alg": "RS256",
            "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8Bf\
  YdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZG\
  YXjHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jR\
  ETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0bunS0K3bA_\
  3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kOzywzwPTuq-cVQDyE\
  N7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQ"
        }
      }
      "display": {
        "name": "My Client Display Name",
        "uri": "https://client.foo/"
      },
    },
    "subject": {
        "formats": ["iss_sub", "opaque"]
    }
}

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

POST /gnap HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/jose
Content-Length: 1047

eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImNyZWF0ZWQiOjE2MTg4ODQ0NzUsImh0bSI6IlBPU1QiLCJ\
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R0cHM6Ly9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vZ25hcCJ9.CnsKICAgICJhY2Nlc3NfdG9r\
ZW4iOiB7CiAgICAgICAgImFjY2VzcyI6IFsKICAgICAgICAgICAgImRvbHBoaW4tbWV\
0YWRhdGEiCiAgICAgICAgXQogICAgfSwKICAgICJpbnRlcmFjdCI6IHsKICAgICAgIC\
Aic3RhcnQiOiBbInJlZGlyZWN0Il0sCiAgICAgICAgImZpbmlzaCI6IHsKICAgICAgI\
CAgICAgIm1ldGhvZCI6ICJyZWRpcmVjdCIsCiAgICAgICAgICAgICJ1cmkiOiAiaHR0\
cHM6Ly9jbGllbnQuZm9vL2NhbGxiYWNrIiwKICAgICAgICAgICAgIm5vbmNlIjogIlZ\
KTE82QTRDQVlMQlhIVFIwS1JPIgogICAgICAgIH0KICAgIH0sCiAgICAiY2xpZW50Ij\
ogewogICAgICAicHJvb2YiOiAiandzIiwKICAgICAgImtleSI6IHsKICAgICAgICAia\
ndrIjogewogICAgICAgICAgICAia2lkIjogImduYXAtcnNhIiwKICAgICAgICAgICAg\
Imt0eSI6ICJSU0EiLAogICAgICAgICAgICAiZSI6ICJBUUFCIiwKICAgICAgICAgICA\
gImFsZyI6ICJSUzI1NiIsCiAgICAgICAgICAgICJuIjogImhZT0otWE9LSVNkTU1TaG\
5fRzRXOW0yMG1UMFZXdFFCc21CQmtJMmNtUnQ0QWk4QmZZZEhzRnpBdFlLT2pwQlIxU\
nBLcEptVkt4SUdOeTBnNlozYWQyWFlzaDhLb3dseVZ5OElrWjhOTXdTcmNVSUJaR1lY\
akhwd2p6dmZHdlhIXzVLSmxuUjNfdVJVcDRaNFVqazJiQ2FLZWdEbjExVjJ2eEU0MWh\
xYVBVbmhSWnhlMGpSRVRkZHpzRTNtdTFTSzhkVENST2p3VWwxNG1VTm84aVRyVG00bj\
BxRGFkejhCa1BvLXV2NEJDMGJ1blMwSzNiQV8zVWdWcDd6QmxRRm9GbkxUTzJ1V3Bfb\
XVMRVdHbDY3Z0JxOU1PM2JyS1hmR2hpM2tPenl3endQVHVxLWNWUUR5RU43YUwwU3hD\
YjNIYzRJZHFEYU1nOHFIVXlPYnBQaXREUSIKICAgICAgICB9CiAgICAgIH0KICAgICA\
gImRpc3BsYXkiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIm5hbWUiOiAiTXkgQ2xpZW50IERpc3BsYXkgTm\
FtZSIsCiAgICAgICAgInVyaSI6ICJodHRwczovL2NsaWVudC5mb28vIgogICAgICB9L\
AogICAgfSwKICAgICJzdWJqZWN0IjogewogICAgICAgICJmb3JtYXRzIjogWyJpc3Nf\
c3ViIiwgIm9wYXF1ZSJdCiAgICB9Cn0K.MwNoVMQp5hVxI0mCs9LlOUdFtkDXaA1_eT\
vOXq7DOGrtDKH7q4vP2xUq3fH2jRAZqnobo0WdPP3eM3NH5QUjW8pa6_QpwdIWkK7r-\
u_52puE0lPBp7J4U2w4l9gIbg8iknsmWmXeY5F6wiGT8ptfuEYGgmloAJd9LIeNvD3U\
LW2h2dz1Pn2eDnbyvgB0Ugae0BoZB4f69fKWj8Z9wvTIjk1LZJN1PcL7_zT8Lrlic9a\
PyzT7Q9ovkd1s-4whE7TrnGUzFc5mgWUn_gsOpsP5mIIljoEEv-FqOW2RyNYulOZl0Q\
8EnnDHV_vPzrHlUarbGg4YffgtwkQhdK72-JOxYQ

8.1. Requesting Resources By Reference

Instead of sending an object describing the requested resource (Section 8), access rights MAY be communicated as a string known to the AS or RS representing the access being requested. Each string SHOULD correspond to a specific expanded object representation at the AS.¶

"access": [
    "read", "dolphin-metadata", "some other thing"
]

This value is opaque to the client instance and MAY be any valid JSON string, and therefore could include spaces, unicode characters, and properly escaped string sequences. However, in some situations the value is intended to be seen and understood by the client software's developer. In such cases, the API designer choosing any such human-readable strings SHOULD take steps to ensure the string values are not easily confused by a developer, such as by limiting the strings to easily disambiguated characters.¶

This functionality is similar in practice to OAuth 2.0's scope parameter [RFC6749], where a single string represents the set of access rights requested by the client instance. As such, the reference string could contain any valid OAuth 2.0 scope value as in Appendix D.5. Note that the reference string here is not bound to the same character restrictions as in OAuth 2.0's scope definition.¶

A single access array MAY include both object-type and string-type resource items. In this non-normative example, the client instance is requesting access to a photo-api and financial-transaction API type as well as the reference values of read, dolphin-metadata, and some other thing.¶

"access": [
    {
        "type": "photo-api",
        "actions": [
            "read",
            "write",
            "delete"
        ],
        "locations": [
            "https://server.example.net/",
            "https://resource.local/other"
        ],
        "datatypes": [
            "metadata",
            "images"
        ]
    },
    "read",
    "dolphin-metadata",
    {
        "type": "financial-transaction",
        "actions": [
            "withdraw"
        ],
        "identifier": "account-14-32-32-3",
        "currency": "USD"
    },
    "some other thing"
]

The requested access is the union of all elements of the array, including both objects and reference strings.¶

9.1. RS-first Method of AS Discovery

If the client instance calls an RS without an access token, or with an invalid access token, the RS MAY respond to the client instance with an authentication header indicating that GNAP needs to be used to access the resource. The address of the GNAP endpoint MUST be sent in the "as_uri" parameter. The RS MAY additionally return a resource reference that the client instance MAY use in its access token request. This resource reference MUST be sufficient for at least the action the client instance was attempting to take at the RS and MAY be more powerful. The means for the RS to determine the resource reference are out of scope of this specification, but some dynamic methods are discussed in [I-D.ietf-gnap-resource-servers]. The content of the resource reference is opaque to the client instance.¶

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

WWW-Authenticate: \
  GNAP as_uri=https://server.example/tx,access=FWWIKYBQ6U56NL1

The client instance then makes a request to the "as_uri" as described in Section 2, with the value of "access" as one of the members of the access array in the access_token portion of the request. The client instance MAY request additional resources and other information. The client instance MAY request multiple access tokens.¶

In this non-normative example, the client instance is requesting a single access token using the resource reference FWWIKYBQ6U56NL1 received from the RS in addition to the dolphin-metadata resource reference that the client instance has been configured with out of band.¶

POST /tx HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...
Digest: sha256=...

{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            "FWWIKYBQ6U56NL1",
            "dolphin-metadata"
        ]
    },
    "client": "KHRS6X63AJ7C7C4AZ9AO"
}

If issued, the resulting access token would contain sufficient access to be used at both referenced resources.¶

12.1. TLS Protection in Transit

All requests in GNAP have to be made over TLS or equivalent as outlined in [BCP195] to protect the contents of the request and response from manipulation and interception by an attacker. This includes all requests from a client instance to the AS, all requests from the client instance to an RS, any requests back to a client instance such as the push-based interaction finish method, and any back-end communications such as from an RS to an AS as described in [I-D.ietf-gnap-resource-servers]. Additionally, all requests between a browser and other components, such as during redirect-based interaction, need to be made over TLS or use equivalent protection.¶

Even though requests from the client instance to the AS are signed, the signature method alone does not protect the request from interception by an attacker. TLS protects the response as well as the request, preventing an attacker from intercepting requested information as it is returned. This is particularly important in the core protocol for security artifacts such as nonces and for personal information such as subject information.¶

The use of key-bound access tokens does not negate the requirement for protecting calls to the RS with TLS. While the keys and signatures associated a bound access token will prevent an attacker from using a stolen token, without TLS an attacker would be able to watch the data being sent to the RS and returned from the RS during legitimate use of the client instance under attack. Additionally, without TLS an attacker would be able to profile the calls made between the client instance and RS, possibly gaining information about the functioning of the API between the client software and RS software that would be otherwise unknown to the attacker.¶

TLS or equivalent protection also needs to be used between the browser and any other components. This applies during initial redirects to an AS's components during interaction, during any interaction with the resource owner, and during any redirect back to the client instance. Without TLS protection on these portions of the process, an attacker could wait for a valid request to start and then take over the resource owner's interaction session.¶

12.2. Signing Requests from the Client Software

Even though all requests in GNAP need to be transmitted over TLS or its equivalent, the use of TLS alone is not sufficient to protect all parts of a multi-party and multi-stage protocol like GNAP, and TLS is not targeted at tying multiple requests to each other over time. To account for this, GNAP makes use of message-level protection and key presentation mechanisms that strongly associate a request with a key held by the client instance (see Section 7).¶

During the initial request from a client instance to the AS, the client instance has to identify and prove possession of a cryptographic key. If the key is known to the AS, such as if it is previously registered or dereferenceable to a trusted source, the AS can associate a set of policies to the client instance identified by the key. Without the requirement that the client instance prove that it holds that key, the AS could not trust that the connection came from any particular client and could not apply any associated policies.¶

Even more importantly, the client instance proving possession of a key on the first request allows the AS to associate future requests with each other. The access token used for grant continuation is bound to the same key and proofing mechanism used by the client instance in its initial request, which means that the client instance needs to prove possession of that same key in future requests allowing the AS to be sure that the same client instance is executing the follow-ups for a given ongoing grant request. Therefore, the AS has to ensure that all subsequent requests for a grant are associated with the same key that started the grant, or the most recent rotation of that key. This need holds true even if the initial key is previously unknown to the AS, such as would be the case when a client instance creates an ephemeral key for its request. Without this ongoing association, an attacker would be able to impersonate a client instance in the midst of a grant request, potentially stealing access tokens and subject information with impunity.¶

Additionally, all access tokens in GNAP default to be associated with the key that was presented during the grant request that created the access token. This association allows an RS to know that the presenter of the access token is the same party that the token was issued to, as identified by their keys. While non-bound bearer tokens are an option in GNAP, these types of tokens have their own tradeoffs discussed elsewhere in this section.¶

TLS functions at the socket layer, ensuring that only the parties on either end of that socket connection can read the information passed along that connection. Each time a new socket connection is made, such as for a new HTTP request, a new trust is re-established that is unrelated to previous connections. As such, it is not possible with TLS alone to know that the same party is making a set of calls, and therefore TLS alone cannot provide the continuity of security needed for GNAP. However, mutual TLS (MTLS) does provide such security characteristics through the use of the TLS client certificate, and thus MTLS is acceptable as a key-presentation mechanism when applied as described in Section 7.3.2.¶

12.3. Protection of Client Instance Key Material

Client instances are identified by their unique keys, and anyone with access to a client instance's key material will be able to impersonate that client instance to all parties. This is true for both calls to the AS as well as calls to an RS using a key-bound access token.¶

Different types of client software have different methods available for creating, managing, and registering keys. GNAP explicitly allows for ephemeral clients, such as SPAs, and single-user clients, such as mobile applications, to create and present their own keys during the initial grant request. The client software can securely generate a keypair on-device and present the public key, along with proof of holding that public key, to the AS as part of the initial request. To facilitate trust in these ephemeral keys, GNAP further allows for an extensible set of client information to be passed with the request. This information can include device posture and third-party attestations of the client software's provenance and authenticity, depending on the needs and capabilities of the client software and its deployment.¶

From GNAP's perspective, each distinct key is a different client instance. However, multiple client instances can be grouped together by an AS policy and treated similarly to each other. For instance, if an AS knows of several different keys for different servers within a cluster, the AS can decide that authorization of one of these servers applies to all other servers within the cluster. An AS that chooses to do this needs to be careful with how it groups different client keys together in its policy, since the breach of one instance would have direct effects on the others in the cluster.¶

Additionally, if an end user controls multiple instances of a single type of client software, such as having an application installed on multiple devices, each of these instances is expected to have a separate key and be issued separate access tokens. However, if the AS is able to group these separate instances together as described above, it can streamline the authorization process for new instances of the same client software. For example, if two client instances can present proof of a valid installation of a piece of client software, the AS would be able to associate the approval of the first instance of this software to all related instances. The AS could then choose to bypass an explicit prompt of the resource owner for approval during authorization, since such approval has already been given. An AS doing such a process would need to take assurance measures that the different instances are in fact correlated and authentic, as well as ensuring the expected resource owner is in control of the client instance.¶

Finally, if multiple instances of client software each have the same key, then from GNAP's perspective, these are functionally the same client instance as GNAP has no reasonable way to differentiate between them. This situation could happen if multiple instances within a cluster can securely share secret information among themselves. Even though there are multiple copies of the software, the shared key makes these copies all present as a single instance. It is considered bad practice to share keys between copies of software unless they are very tightly integrated with each other and can be closely managed. It is particularly bad practice to allow an end-user to copy keys between client instances and to willingly use the same key in multiple instances.¶

12.4. Protection of Authorization Server

The AS performs critical functions in GNAP, including authenticating client software, managing interactions with end-users to gather consent and provide notice, and issuing access tokens for client instances to present to resource servers. As such, protecting the AS is central to any GNAP deployment.¶

If an attacker is able to gain control over an AS, they would be able to create fraudulent tokens and manipulate registration information to allow for malicious clients. These tokens and clients would be trusted by other components in the ecosystem under the protection of the AS.¶

If the AS is using signed access tokens, an attacker in control of the AS's signing keys would be able to manufacture fraudulent tokens for use at RS's under the protection of the AS.¶

If an attacker is able to impersonate an AS, they would be able to trick legitimate client instances into making signed requests for information which could potentially be proxied to a real AS. To combat this, all communications to the AS need to be made over TLS or its equivalent, and the software making the connection has to validate the certificate chain of the host it is connecting to.¶

Consequently, protecting, monitoring, and auditing the AS is paramount to preserving the security of a GNAP-protected ecosystem.¶

12.5. Symmetric and Asymmetric Client Instance Keys

The cryptographic methods used by GNAP for key-proofing can support both asymmetric and symmetric cryptography, and can be extended to use a wide variety of mechanisms. While symmetric cryptographic systems have some benefits in speed and simplicity, they have a distinct drawback that both parties need access to the same key in order to do both signing and verification of the message. This means that when the client instance calls the AS to request a token, the AS needs to know the exact value of the client instance's key (or be able to derive it) in order to validate the key proof signature. With asymmetric keys, the client needs only to send its public key to the AS to allow for verification that the client holds the associated private key, regardless of whether that key was pre-registered or not with the AS.¶

When used to bind to an access token, a key value must be known by the RS in order to validate the proof signature on the request. Common methods for communicating these proofing keys include putting information in a structured access token and allowing the RS to look up the associated key material against the value of the access token. With symmetric cryptography, both of these methods would expose the signing key to the RS, and in the case of an structured access token, potentially to any party that can see the access token itself unless the token's payload has been encrypted. Any of these parties would then be able to make calls using the access token by creating a valid signature. With asymmetric cryptography, the RS only needs to know the public key associated with the token in order to validate, and therefore cannot create any new calls.¶

Symmetric keys also have the expected advantage of providing better protection against quantum threats in the future. Also, these types of keys (and their secure derivations) are widely supported among many cloud-based key management systems.¶

While both signing approaches are allowed, GNAP treats these two classes of keys somewhat differently. Only the public portion of asymmetric keys are allowed to be sent by value in requests to the AS when establishing a connection. Since sending a symmetric key (or the private portion of an asymmetric key) would expose the signing material to any parties on the request path, including any attackers, sending these kinds of keys is prohibited. Symmetric keys can still be used by client instances, but only a reference to the key and not its value can be sent. This allows the AS to use pre-registered symmetric keys as well as key derivation schemes to take advantage of symmetric cryptography but without requiring key distribution at runtime, which would expose the keys in transit.¶

Both the AS and client software can use systems such as hardware security modules to strengthen their key security storage and generation for both asymmetric and symmetric keys.¶

12.6. Generation of Access Tokens

The content of access tokens need to be such that only the generating AS would be able to create them, and the contents cannot be manipulated by an attacker to gain different or additional access rights.¶

One method for accomplishing this is to use a cryptographically random value for the access token, generated by the AS using a secure randomization function with sufficiently high entropy. The odds of an attacker guessing the output of the randomization function to collide with a valid access token are exceedingly small, and even then the attacker would not have any control over what the access token would represent since that information would be held close by the AS.¶

Another method for accomplishing this is to use a structured token that is cryptographically signed. In this case, the payload of the access token declares to the RS what the token is good for, but the signature applied by the AS during token generation covers this payload. Only the AS can create such a signature and therefore only the AS can create such a signed token. The odds of an attacker being able to guess a signature value with a useful payload are exceedingly small. This technique only works if all targeted RS's check the signature of the access token. Any RS that does not validate the signature of all presented tokens would be susceptible to injection of a modified or falsified token. Furthermore, an AS has to carefully protect the keys used to sign access tokens, since anyone with access to these signing keys would be able to create seemingly-valid access tokens using them.¶

12.7. Bearer Access Tokens

Bearer access tokens can be used by any party that has access to the token itself, without any additional information. As a natural consequence, any RS that a bearer token is presented to has the technical capability of presenting that bearer token to another RS, as long as the token is valid. It also means that any party that is able capture of the token value in storage or in transit is able to use the access token. While bearer tokens are inherently simpler, this simplicity has been misapplied and abused in making needlessly insecure systems.¶

In GNAP, key-bound access tokens are the default due to their higher security properties. While bearer tokens can be used in GNAP, their use should be limited onto to cases where the simplicity benefits outweigh the significant security downsides.¶

12.8. Key-Bound Token Access Tokens

Key-bound access tokens, as the name suggests, are bound to a specific key and must be presented along with proof of that key during use. The key itself is not presented at the same time as the token, so even if a token value is captured, it cannot be used to make a new request. This is particularly true for an RS, which will see the token value but will not see the keys used to make the request.¶

Key-bound access tokens provide this additional layer of protection only when the RS checks the signature of the message presented with the token. Acceptance of an invalid presentation signature, or failure to check the signature entirely, would allow an attacker to make calls with a captured access token without having access to the related signing key material.¶

In addition to validating the signature of the presentation message itself, the RS also needs to ensure that the signing key used is appropriate for the presented token. If an RS does not ensure that the right keys were used to sign a message with a specific token, an attacker would be able to capture an access token and sign the request with their own keys, thereby negating the benefits of using key-bound access tokens.¶

The RS also needs to ensure that a sufficient portions of the message are covered by the signature. Any items outside the signature could still affect the API's processing decisions, but these items would not be strongly bound to the token presentation. As such, an attacker could capture a valid request, then manipulate portions of the request outside of the signature envelope in order to cause unwanted actions at the protected API.¶

Some key-bound tokens are susceptible to replay attacks, depending on the details of the signing method used. If a signature method covers only portions of a given request, that same signature proof can be used by an attacker to make a similar call, potentially even varying elements that are outside of the protection of the signature. Key proofing mechanisms used with access tokens therefore need to use replay protection mechanisms covered under the signature such as a per-message nonce, a reasonably short time validity window, or other uniqueness constraints. The details of using these will vary depending on the key proofing mechanism in use, but for example, HTTP Message Signatures has both a created and nonce signature parameter as well as the ability to cover significant portions of the HTTP message.¶

12.9. Exposure of End-user Credentials to Client Instance

As a delegation protocol, one of the main goals of GNAP is to prevent the client software from being exposed to any credentials or information about the end-user or resource owner as a requirement of the delegation process. By using the variety of interaction mechanisms, the resource owner can interact with the AS without ever authenticating to the client software, and without the client software having to impersonate the resource owner through replay of their credentials.¶

Consequently, no interaction methods defined in the GNAP core require the end-user to enter their credentials, but it is technologically possible for an extension to be defined to carry such values. Such an extension would be dangerous as it would allow rogue client software to directly collect, store, and replay the end-user's credentials outside of any legitimate use within a GNAP request.¶

The concerns of such an extension could be mitigated through use of a challenge and response unlocked by the end user's credentials. For example, the AS presents a challenge as part of an interaction start method, and the client instance signs that challenge using a key derived from a password presented by the end user. It would be possible for the client software to collect this password in a secure software enclave without exposing the password to the rest of the client software or putting it across the wire to the AS. The AS can validate this challenge response against a known password for the identified end user. While an approach such as this does not remove all of the concerns surrounding such a password-based scheme, it is at least possible to implement in a more secure fashion than simply collecting and replaying the password. Even so, such schemes should only ever be used by trusted clients due to the ease of abusing them.¶

12.10. Mixing Up Authorization Servers

If a client instance is able to work with multiple AS's simultaneously, it is more possible for an attacker to add a compromised AS to the client instance's configuration and cause the client software to start a request at the compromised AS. This AS could then proxy the client's request to a valid AS in order to attempt to get the resource owner to approve access for the legitimate client instance.¶

A client instance needs to always be aware of which AS it is talking to throughout a grant process, and ensure that any callback for one AS does not get conflated with the callback to different AS. The interaction finish hash calculate allows a client instance to protect against this kind of substitution, but only if the client instance validates the hash. If the client instance does not use an interaction finish method or does not check the interaction finish hash value, the compromised AS can be granted a valid access token on behalf of the resource owner. See [attack-surfaces] for details of one such attack, which has been since addressed in this document by including the grant endpoint in the interaction hash calculation. The client instance still needs to validate the hash for the attack to be prevented.¶

12.11. Processing of Client-Presented User Information

GNAP allows the client instance to present assertions and identifiers of the current user to the AS as part of the initial request. This information should only ever be taken by the AS as a hint, since the AS has no way to tell if the represented person is present at the client software, without using an interaction mechanism. This information does not guarantee the given user is there, but it does constitute a statement by the client software that the AS can take into account.¶

For example, if a specific user is claimed to be present prior to interaction, but a different user is shown to be present during interaction, the AS can either determine this to be an error or signal to the client instance through returned subject information that the current user has changed from what the client instance thought. This user information can also be used by the AS to streamline the interaction process when the user is present. For example, instead of having the user type in their account identifier during interaction at a redirected URL, the AS can immediately challenge the user for their account credentials. Alternatively, if an existing session is detected, the AS can determine that it matches the identifier provided by the client and subsequently skip an explicit authentication event by the resource owner.¶

In cases where the AS trusts the client software more completely, due to policy or by previous approval of a given client instance, the AS can take this user information as a statement that the user is present and could issue access tokens and release subject information without interaction. The AS should only take such action in very limited circumstances, as a client instance could assert whatever it likes for the user's identifiers in its request.¶

When a client instance presents an assertion to the AS, the AS needs to evaluate that assertion. Since the AS is unlikely to be the intended audience of an assertion held by the client software, the AS will need to evaluate the assertion in a different context. Even in this case, the AS can still evaluate that the assertion was generated by a trusted party, was appropriately signed, and is within any time validity windows stated by the assertion. If the client instance's audience identifier is known to the AS and can be associated with the client instance's presented key, the AS can also evaluate that the appropriate client instance is presenting the claimed assertion. All of this will prevent an attacker from presenting a manufactured assertion, or one captured from an untrusted system. However, without validating the audience of the assertion, a captured assertion could be presented by the client instance to impersonate a given end user. In such cases, the assertion offers little more protection than a simple identifier would.¶

A special case exists where the AS is the generator of the assertion being presented by the client instance. In these cases, the AS can validate that it did issue the assertion and it is associated with the client instance presenting the assertion.¶

12.12. Client Instance Pre-registration

Each client instance is identified by its own unique key, and for some kinds of client software such as a web server or backend system, this identification can be facilitated by registering a single key for a piece of client software ahead of time. This registration can be associated with a set of display attributes to be used during the authorization process, identifying the client software to the user. In these cases, it can be assumed that only one instance of client software will exist, likely to serve many different users.¶

A client's registration record needs to include its identifying key. Furthermore, it is the case that any clients using symmetric cryptography for key proofing mechanisms need to have their keys pre-registered. The registration should also include any information that would aid in the authorization process, such as a display name and logo. The registration record can also limit a given client to ask for certain kinds of information and access, or be limited to specific interaction mechanisms at runtime.¶

It also is sensible to pre-register client instances when the software is acting autonomously, without the need for a runtime approval by a resource owner or any interaction with an end-user. In these cases, an AS needs to rest on the trust decisions that have been determined prior to runtime in determining what rights and tokens to grant to a given client instance.¶

However, it does not make sense to pre-register many types of clients. Single-page applications (SPAs) and mobile/desktop applications in particular present problems with pre-registration. For SPAs, the instances are ephemeral in nature and long-term registration of a single instance leads to significant storage and management overhead at the AS. For mobile applications, each installation of the client software is a separate instance, and sharing a key among all instances would be detrimental to security as the compromise of any single installation would compromise all copies for all users.¶

An AS can treat these classes of client software differently from each other, perhaps by allowing access to certain high-value APIs only to pre-registered known clients, or by requiring an active end-user delegation of authority to any client software not pre-registered.¶

An AS can also provide warnings and caveats to resource owners during the authorization process, allowing the user to make an informed decision regarding the software they are authorizing. For example, if the AS has done vetting of the client software and this specific instance, it can present a different authorization screen compared to a client instance that is presenting all of its information at runtime.¶

12.13. Client Instance Impersonation

If client instances are allowed to set their own user-facing display information, such as a display name and website URL, a malicious client instance could impersonate legitimate client software for the purposes of tricking users into authorizing the malicious client.¶

Requiring clients to pre-register does not fully mitigate this problem since many pre-registration systems have self-service portals for management of client registration, allowing authenticated developers to enter self-asserted information into the management portal.¶

An AS can mitigate this by actively filtering all self-asserted values presented by client software, both dynamically as part of GNAP and through a registration portal, to limit the kinds of impersonation that would be done.¶

An AS can also warn the resource owner about the provenance of the information it is displaying, allowing the resource owner to make a more informed delegation decision. For example, an AS can visually differentiate between a client instance that can be traced back to a specific developer's registration and an instance that has self-asserted its own key and display information.¶

12.14. Interception of Information in the Browser

Most information passed through the web-browser is susceptible to interception and possible manipulation by elements within the browser such as scripts loaded within pages. Information in the URL is exposed through browser and server logs, and can also leak to other parties through HTTP Referrer headers.¶

GNAP's design limits the information passed directly through the browser, allowing for opaque URLs in most circumstances. For the redirect-based interaction finish mechanism, named query parameters are used to carry unguessable opaque values. For these, GNAP requires creation and validation of a cryptographic hash to protect the query parameters added to the URL and associate them with an ongoing grant process. The client instance has to properly validate this hash to prevent an attacker from injecting an interaction reference intended for a different AS or client instance.¶

Several interaction start mechanisms use URLs created by the AS and passed to the client instance. While these URLs are opaque to the client instance, it's possible for the AS to include parameters, paths, and other pieces of information that could leak security data or be manipulated by a party in the middle of the transaction.¶

12.15. Callback URL Manipulation

The callback URL used in interaction finish mechanisms is defined by the client instance. This URL is opaque to the AS, but can contain information relevant to the client instance's operations. In particular, the client instance can include state information to allow the callback request to be associated with an ongoing grant request.¶

Since this URL is exposed to the end-user's browser, it is susceptible to both logging and manipulation in transit before the request is made to the client software. As such, a client instance should never put security-critical or private information into the callback URL in a cleartext form. For example, if the client software includes a post-redirect target URL in its callback URL to the AS, this target URL could be manipulated by an attacker, creating an open redirector at the client. Instead, a client instance can use an unguessable identifier into the URL that can then be used by the client software to look up the details of the pending request. Since this approach requires some form of statefulness by the client software during the redirection process, clients that are not capable of holding state through a redirect should not use redirect-based interaction mechanisms.¶

12.16. Redirection Status Codes

As already described in [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics], a server should never use the HTTP 307 status code to redirect a request that potentially contains user credentials. If an HTTP redirect is used for such a request, the HTTP status code 303 "See Other" should be used instead.¶

The status code 307, as defined in the HTTP standard [RFC7231], requires the user agent to preserve the method and body of a request, thus submitting the body of the POST request to the redirect target. In the HTTP standard [RFC7231], only the status code 303 unambiguously enforces rewriting the HTTP POST request to an HTTP GET request, which eliminates the POST body from the redirected request. For all other status codes, including status code 302, user agents are allowed not to rewrite a POST request into a GET request and thus to resubmit the body.¶

The use of status code 307 results in a vulnerability when using the redirect interaction finish method (Section 3.3.4). With this method, the AS potentially prompts the RO to enter their credentials in a form that is then submitted back to the AS (using an HTTP POST request). The AS checks the credentials and, if successful, may directly redirect the RO to the client instance's redirect URI. Due to the use of status code 307, the RO's user agent now transmits the RO's credentials to the client instance. A malicious client instance can then use the obtained credentials to impersonate the RO at the AS.¶

Redirection away from the initial URL in an interaction session could also leak information found in that initial URL through the HTTP Referer header field, which would be sent by the user agent to the redirect target. To avoid such leakage, a server can first redirect to an internal interstitial page without any identifying or sensitive information on the URL before processing the request. When the user agent is ultimately redirected from this page, no part of the original interaction URL will be found in the Referrer header.¶

12.17. MTLS Message Integrity

The MTLS key proofing mechanism (Section 7.3.2) provides a means for a client instance to present a key using a certificate the TLS layer. Since TLS protects the entire HTTP message in transit, verification of the TLS client certificate presented with the message provides a sufficient binding between the two. However, since TLS is functioning at a separate layer from HTTP, there is no direct connection between the TLS key presentation and the message itself, other than the fact that the message was presented over the TLS channel. That is to say, any HTTP message can be presented over the TLS channel in question with the same level of trust. The verifier is responsible for ensuring the key in the TLS client certificate is the one expected for a particular request. For example, if the request is a grant request, the AS needs to compare the TLS client certificate presented at the TLS layer to the key identified in the request body itself (either by value or through a referenced identifier).¶

Furthermore, the prevalence of the TLS-terminating reverse proxy (TTRP) pattern in deployments adds a wrinkle to the situation. In this common pattern, the TTRP validates the TLS connection and then forwards the HTTP message contents onward to an internal system for processing. The system processing the HTTP message no longer has access to the original TLS connection's information and context. To compensate for this, the TTRP could inject the TLS client certificate into the forwarded request as a header parameter using [I-D.ietf-httpbis-client-cert-field], giving the downstream system access to the certificate information. The TTRP has to be trusted to provide accurate certificate information, and the connection between the TTRP and the downstream system also has to be protected. The TTRP could provide some additional assurance, for example, by adding its own signature to the Client-Cert header field using [I-D.ietf-httpbis-message-signatures]. This signature would be effectively ignored by GNAP but understood by the downstream service as part of its deployment.¶

Additional considerations for different types of deployment patterns and key distribution mechanisms for MTLS are found in Section 12.18.¶

12.18. MTLS Deployment Patterns

GNAP does not specify how a client instance's keys could be made known to the AS ahead of time. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be used to manage the keys used by client instances when calling the AS, allowing the AS to trust a root key from a trusted authority. This method is particularly relevant to the MTLS key proofing method, where the client instance presents its certificate to the AS as part of the TLS connection. An AS using PKI to validate the MTLS connection would need to ensure that the presented certificate was issued by a trusted certificate authority before allowing the connection to continue. PKI-based certificates would allow a key to be revoked and rotated through management at the certificate authority without requiring additional registration or management at the AS. PKI has historically been difficult to deploy, especially at scale, but it remains an appropriate solution for systems where the required overhead is not an impediment.¶

MTLS in GNAP need not use a PKI backing, as self-signed certificates and certificates from untrusted authorities can still be presented as part of a TLS connection. In this case, the verifier would validate the connection but accept whatever certificate was presented by the client software. This specific certificate would then be bound to all future connections from that client software by being bound to the resulting access tokens. See Section 12.17 for more considerations on MTLS as a key proofing mechanism.¶

12.19. Interception of Responses from the AS

Responses from the AS contain information vital to both the security and privacy operations of GNAP. This information includes nonces used in cryptographic calculations, subject identifiers, assertions, public keys, and information about what client software is requesting and was granted.¶

In addition, if bearer tokens are used or keys are issued alongside a bound access token, the response from the AS contains all information necessary for use of the contained access token. Any party that is capable of viewing such a response, such as an intermediary proxy, would be able to exfiltrate and use this token. If the access token is instead bound to the client instance's presented key, intermediaries no longer have sufficient information to use the token. They can still, however, gain information about the end user as well as the actions of the client software.¶

12.20. Key Distribution

The keys for client instances could be distributed as part of the deployment process of instances of the client software. For example, an application installation framework could generate a keypair for each copy of client software, then both install it into the client software upon installation and registering that instance with the AS.¶

Additionally, it's possible for the AS to generate keys to be used with access tokens that are separate from the keys used by the client instance to request tokens. In this method, the AS would generate the asymmetric keypair or symmetric key and return the entire key, including all private signing information, to the client instance alongside the access token itself. This approach would make interception of the return from the token endpoint equivalent to that of a bearer token, since all information required to use the access token would be present in the request.¶

12.21. Interaction Finish Modes and Polling

During the interaction process, the client instance usually hands control of the user experience over to another component, beit the system browser, another application, or some action the resource owner is instructed to take on another device. By using an interaction finish method, the client instance can be securely notified by the AS when the interaction is completed and the next phase of the protocol should occur. This process includes information that the client instance can use to validate the finish call from the AS and prevent some injection, session hijacking, and phishing attacks.¶

Some types of client deployment are unable to receive an interaction finish message. Without an interaction finish method to notify it, the client instance will need to poll the grant continuation API while waiting for the resource owner to approve or deny the request. An attacker could take advantage of this situation by capturing the interaction start parameters and phishing a legitimate user into authorizing the attacker's waiting client instance, which would in turn have no way of associating the completed interaction with the start of the request.¶

However, it is important to note that this pattern is practically indistinguishable from some legitimate use cases. For example, a smart device emits a code for the resource owner to enter on a separate device. The smart device has to poll because the expected behavior is that the interaction will take place on the separate device, without a way to return information to the original device's context.¶

As such, developers need to weigh the risks of forgoing an interaction finish method against the deployment capabilities of the client software and its environment. Due to the increased security, an interaction finish method should be employed whenever possible.¶

12.22. Storage of Information During Interaction and Continuation

When starting an interactive grant request, a client application has a number of protocol elements that it needs to manage, including nonces, references, keys, access tokens, and other elements. During the interaction process, the client instance usually hands control of the user experience over to another component, beit the system browser, another application, or some action the resource owner is instructed to take on another device. In order for the client instance to make its continuation call, it will need to recall all of these protocol elements. Usually this means the client instance will need to store these protocol elements in some retrievable fashion.¶

If the security protocol elements are stored on the end-user's device, such as in browser storage or in local application data stores, capture and exfiltration of this information could allow an attacker to continue a pending transaction instead of the client instance. Client software can make use of secure storage mechanisms, including hardware-based key and data storage, to prevent such exfiltration.¶

Note that in GNAP, the client instance has to choose its interaction finish URL prior to making the first call to the AS. As such, the interaction finish URL will often have a unique identifier for the ongoing request, allowing the client instance to access the correct portion of its storage. Since this URL is passed to other parties and often used through a browser, this URL should not contain any security-sensitive information that would be valuable to an attacker, such as any token identifier, nonce, or user information. Instead, a cryptographically random value is suggested.¶

12.23. Denial of Service (DoS) through Grant Continuation

When a client instance starts off an interactive process, it will eventually need to continue the grant request in a subsequent message to the AS. It's possible for a naive client implementation to continuously send continuation requests to the AS while waiting for approval, especially if no interaction finish method is used. Such constant requests could overwhelm the AS's ability to respond to both these and other requests.¶

To mitigate this for well-behaved client software, the continuation response contains a wait parameter that is intended to tell the client instance how long it should wait until making its next request. This value can be used to back off client software that is checking too quickly by returning increasing wait times for a single client instance.¶

If client software ignores the wait value and makes its continuation calls too quickly, or if the client software assumes the absence of the wait values means it should poll immediately, the AS can choose to return errors to the offending client instance, including possibly canceling the ongoing grant request. With well-meaning client software these errors can indicate a need to change the client software's programmed behavior.¶

12.24. Exhaustion of Random Value Space

Several parts of the GNAP process make use of unguessable randomized values, such as nonces, tokens, and randomized URLs. Since these values are intended to be unique, a sufficiently powerful attacker could make a large number of requests to trigger generation of randomized values in an attempt to exhaust the random number generation space. While this attack is particularly applicable to the AS, client software could likewise be targeted by an attacker triggering new grant requests against an AS.¶

To mitigate this, software can ensure that its random values are chosen from a significantly large pool that exhaustion of that pool is prohibitive for an attacker. Additionally, the random values can be time-boxed in such a way as their validity windows are reasonably short. Since many of the random values used within GNAP are used within limited portions of the protocol, it is reasonable for a particular random value to be valid for only a small amount of time. For example, the nonces used for interaction finish hash calculation need only to be valid while the client instance is waiting for the finish callback and can be functionally expired when the interaction has completed. Similarly, artifacts like access tokens and the interaction reference can be limited to have lifetimes tied to their functional utility. Finally, each different category of artifact (nonce, token, reference, identifier, etc.) can be generated from a separate random pool of values instead of a single global value space.¶

12.25. Front-channel URLs

Some interaction methods in GNAP make use of URLs accessed through the end-user's browser, known collectively as front-channel communication. These URLs are most notably present in the redirect interaction start method and the redirect interaction finish mode. Since these URLs are intended to be given to the end-user, the end user and their browser will be subjected to anything hosted at that URL including viruses, malware, and phishing scams. This kind of risk is inherent to all redirection-based protocols, including GNAP when used in this way.¶

When talking to a new or unknown AS, a client instance might want to check the URL from the interaction start against a blocklist and warn the end-user before redirecting them. Many client instances will provide an interstitial message prior to redirection in order to prepare the user for control of the user experience being handed to the domain of the AS, and such a method could be used to warn the user of potential threats. For instance, a rogue AS impersonating a well-known service provider. Client software can also prevent this by managing an allowlist of known and trusted AS's.¶

Alternatively, an attacker could start a GNAP request with a known and trusted AS but include their own attack site URL as the callback for the finish method. The attacker would then send the interaction start URL to the victim and get them to click on it. Since the URL is at the known AS, the victim is inclined to do so. The victim will then be prompted to approve the attacker's application, and in most circumstances the victim will then be redirected to the attacker's site whether or not the user approved the request. The AS could mitigate this partially by using a blocklist and allowlist of interaction finish URLs during the client instance's initial request, but this approach can be especially difficult if the URL has any dynamic portion chosen by the client software. The AS can couple these checks with policies associated with the client instance that has been authenticated in the request. If the AS has any doubt about the interaction finish URL, the AS can provide an interstitial warning to the end-user before processing the redirect.¶

Ultimately, all protocols that use redirect-based communication through the user's browser are susceptible to having an attacker try to co-opt one or more of those URLs in order to harm the user. It is the responsibility of the AS and the client software to provide appropriate warnings, education, and mitigation to protect end users.¶

12.26. Processing Assertions

Identity assertions can be used in GNAP to convey subject information, both from the AS to the client instance in a response (Section 3.4) and from the client instance to the AS in a request (Section 2.2). In both of these circumstances, when an assertion is passed in GNAP, the receiver of the assertion needs to parse and process the assertion. As assertions are complex artifacts with their own syntax and security, special care needs to be taken to prevent the assertion values from being used as an attack vector.¶

All assertion processing needs to account for the security aspects of the assertion format in use. In particular, the processor needs to parse the assertion from a JSON string object, and apply the appropriate cryptographic processes to ensure the integrity of the assertion.¶

For example, when SAML 2 assertions are used, the receiver hast to parse an XML document. There are many well-known security vulnerabilities in XML parsers, and the XML standard itself can be attacked through the use of processing instructions and entity expansions to cause problems with the processor. Therefore, any system capable of processing SAML 2 assertions also needs to have a secure and correct XML parser. In addition to this, the SAML 2 specification uses XML Signatures, which have their own implementation problems that need to be accounted for. Similar requirements exist for OpenID Connect's ID token, which is based on the JSON Web Token (JWT) format and the related JSON Object Signing And Encryption (JOSE) cryptography suite.¶

12.27. Stolen Token Replay

If a client instance can request tokens at multiple AS's, and the client instance uses the same keys to make its requests across those different AS's, then it is possible for an attacker to replay a stolen token issued by an honest AS from a compromised AS, thereby binding the stolen token to the client instance's key in a different context. The attacker can manipulate the client instance into using the stolen token at an RS, particularly at an RS that is expecting a token from the honest AS. Since the honest AS issued the token and the client instance presents the token with its expected bound key, the attack succeeds.¶

This attack has several preconditions. In this attack, the attacker does not need access to the client instance's key and cannot use the stolen token directly at the RS, but the attacker is able to get the access token value in some fashion. The client instance also needs to be configured to talk to multiple AS's, including the attacker's controlled AS. Finally, the client instance needs to be able to be manipulated by the attacker to call the RS while using a token issued from the stolen AS. The RS does not need to be compromised or made to trust the attacker's AS.¶

To protect against this attack, the client instance can use a different key for each AS that it talks to. Since the replayed token will be bound to the key used at the honest AS, the uncompromised RS will reject the call since the client instance will be using the key used at the attacker's AS instead with the same token. When the MTLS key proofing method is used, a client instance can use self-signed certificates to use a different key for each AS that it talks to, as discussed in Section 12.18.¶

Additionally, the client instance can keep a strong association between the RS and a specific AS that it trusts to issue tokens for that RS. This strong binding also helps against some forms of AS mix-up attacks (Section 12.10). Managing this binding is outside the scope of GNAP core, but it can be managed either as a configuration element for the client instance or dynamically through discovering the AS from the RS (Section 9.1).¶

The details of this attack are available in [HELMSCHMIDT2022] with additional discussion and considerations.¶

13.1. Surveillance

Surveillance is the observation or monitoring of an individual's communications or activities. Surveillance can be conducted by observers or eavesdroppers at any point along the communications path.¶

GNAP assumes the TLS protection used throughout the spec is intact. Without the protection of TLS, there are many points throughout the use of GNAP that would lead to possible surveillance.¶

13.2. Stored Data

Several parties in the GNAP process are expected to persist data at least temporarily, if not semi-permanently, for the normal functioning of the system. If compromised, this could lead to exposure of sensitive information. This section documents the potentially sensitive information each party in GNAP is expected to store for normal operation. Naturally it is possible that any party is storing information for longer than technically necessary of the protocol mechanics (such as audit logs, etc).¶

The authorization server is expected to store subject identifiers for user indefinitely, in order to be able to include them in the responses to clients. The authorization server is also expected to store client key identifiers associated with display information about the client such as its name and logo.¶

The client is expected to store its client instance key indefinitely, in order to authenticate to the authorization server for the normal functioning of the GNAP flows. Additionally, the client will be temporarily storing artifacts issued by the authorization server during a flow, and these artifacts SHOULD be discarded by the client when the transaction is complete.¶

The resource server is not required to store any state for its normal operation. Depending on the implementation of access tokens, the resource server may need to cache public keys from the authorization server in order to validate access tokens.¶

13.3. Intrusion

Intrusion refers to the ability of various parties to send unsolicited messages or cause denial of service for unrelated parties.¶

If the resource owner is different from the end user, there is an opportunity for the end user to cause unsolicited messages to be sent to the resource owner if the system prompts the resource owner for consent when an end user attempts to access their data.¶

The format and contents of subject identifiers are intentionally not defined by GNAP. If the authorization server uses values for subject identifiers that are also identifiers for communication channels, (e.g. an email address or phone number), this opens up the possibility for a client to learn this information when it was not otherwise authorized to access this kind of data about the user.¶

13.4. Correlation

The threat of correlation is the combination of various pieces of information related to an individual in a way that defies their expectations of what others know about them.¶

13.5. Disclosure in Shared References

Throughout many parts of GNAP, the parties pass shared references between each other, sometimes in place of the values themselves. For example the interact_ref value used throughout the flow. These references are intended to be random strings and should not contain any private or sensitive data that would potentially leak information between parties.¶

D.1. Redirect-Based User Interaction

In this scenario, the user is the RO and has access to a web browser, and the client instance can take front-channel callbacks on the same device as the user. This combination is analogous to the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code grant type.¶

The client instance initiates the request to the AS. Here the client instance identifies itself using its public key.¶

POST /tx HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...
Digest: sha256=...

{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            {
                "actions": [
                    "read",
                    "write",
                    "dolphin"
                ],
                "locations": [
                    "https://server.example.net/",
                    "https://resource.local/other"
                ],
                "datatypes": [
                    "metadata",
                    "images"
                ]
            }
        ],
    },
    "client": {
      "key": {
        "proof": "httpsig",
        "jwk": {
            "kty": "RSA",
            "e": "AQAB",
            "kid": "xyz-1",
            "alg": "RS256",
            "n": "kOB5rR4Jv0GMeLaY6_It_r3ORwdf8ci_JtffXyaSx8..."
        }
      }
    },
    "interact": {
        "start": ["redirect"],
        "finish": {
            "method": "redirect",
            "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455",
            "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC"
        }
    }
}

The AS processes the request and determines that the RO needs to interact. The AS returns the following response giving the client instance the information it needs to connect. The AS has also indicated to the client instance that it can use the given instance identifier to identify itself in future requests (Section 2.3.1).¶

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
    "interact": {
      "redirect":
        "https://server.example.com/interact/4CF492MLVMSW9MKM",
      "finish": "MBDOFXG4Y5CVJCX821LH"
    }
    "continue": {
        "access_token": {
            "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU"
        },
        "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue"
    },
    "instance_id": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO"
}

The client instance saves the response and redirects the user to the interaction_url by sending the following HTTP message to the user's browser.¶

HTTP 302 Found
Location: https://server.example.com/interact/4CF492MLVMSW9MKM

The user's browser fetches the AS's interaction URL. The user logs in, is identified as the RO for the resource being requested, and approves the request. Since the AS has a callback parameter, the AS generates the interaction reference, calculates the hash, and redirects the user back to the client instance with these additional values added as query parameters.¶

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

HTTP 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.net/return/123455\
  ?hash=p28jsq0Y2KK3WS__a42tavNC64ldGTBroywsWxT4md_jZQ1R2\
    HZT8BOWYHcLmObM7XHPAdJzTZMtKBsaraJ64A\
  &interact_ref=4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1

The client instance receives this request from the user's browser. The client instance ensures that this is the same user that was sent out by validating session information and retrieves the stored pending request. The client instance uses the values in this to validate the hash parameter. The client instance then calls the continuation URL and presents the handle and interaction reference in the request body. The client instance signs the request as above.¶

POST /continue HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...
Digest: sha256=...

{
    "interact_ref": "4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1"
}

The AS retrieves the pending request based on the handle and issues an access token and returns this to the client instance.¶

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
    "access_token": {
        "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0",
        "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\
            M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L",
        "access": [{
            "actions": [
                "read",
                "write",
                "dolphin"
            ],
            "locations": [
                "https://server.example.net/",
                "https://resource.local/other"
            ],
            "datatypes": [
                "metadata",
                "images"
            ]
        }]
    },
    "continue": {
        "access_token": {
            "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU"
        },
        "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue"
    }
}

D.2. Secondary Device Interaction

In this scenario, the user does not have access to a web browser on the device and must use a secondary device to interact with the AS. The client instance can display a user code or a printable QR code. The client instance is not able to accept callbacks from the AS and needs to poll for updates while waiting for the user to authorize the request.¶

The client instance initiates the request to the AS.¶

POST /tx HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...
Digest: sha256=...

{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            "dolphin-metadata", "some other thing"
        ],
    },
    "client": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO",
    "interact": {
        "start": ["redirect", "user_code"]
    }
}

The AS processes this and determines that the RO needs to interact. The AS supports both redirect URIs and user codes for interaction, so it includes both. Since there is no interaction finish mode, the AS does not include a nonce, but does include a "wait" parameter on the continuation section because it expects the client instance to poll for results.¶

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
    "interact": {
        "redirect": "https://srv.ex/MXKHQ",
        "user_code": {
            "code": "A1BC-3DFF",
            "url": "https://srv.ex/device"
        }
    },
    "continue": {
        "access_token": {
            "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU"
        },
        "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue/VGJKPTKC50",
        "wait": 60
    }
}

The client instance saves the response and displays the user code visually on its screen along with the static device URL. The client instance also displays the short interaction URL as a QR code to be scanned.¶

If the user scans the code, they are taken to the interaction endpoint and the AS looks up the current pending request based on the incoming URL. If the user instead goes to the static page and enters the code manually, the AS looks up the current pending request based on the value of the user code. In both cases, the user logs in, is identified as the RO for the resource being requested, and approves the request. Once the request has been approved, the AS displays to the user a message to return to their device.¶

Meanwhile, the client instance periodically polls the AS every 60 seconds at the continuation URL. The client instance signs the request using the same key and method that it did in the first request.¶

POST /continue/VGJKPTKC50 HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...
Digest: sha256=...

The AS retrieves the pending request based on the handle and determines that it has not yet been authorized. The AS indicates to the client instance that no access token has yet been issued but it can continue to call after another 60 second timeout.¶

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
    "continue": {
        "access_token": {
            "value": "G7YQT4KQQ5TZY9SLSS5E"
        },
        "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue/ATWHO4Q1WV",
        "wait": 60
    }
}

Note that the continuation URL and access token have been rotated since they were used by the client instance to make this call. The client instance polls the continuation URL after a 60 second timeout using this new information.¶

POST /continue/ATWHO4Q1WV HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: GNAP G7YQT4KQQ5TZY9SLSS5E
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...
Digest: sha256=...

The AS retrieves the pending request based on the URL and access token, determines that it has been approved, and issues an access token for the client to use at the RS.¶

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
    "access_token": {
        "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0",
        "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\
            M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L",
        "access": [
            "dolphin-metadata", "some other thing"
        ]
    }
}

D.3. No User Involvement

In this scenario, the client instance is requesting access on its own behalf, with no user to interact with.¶

The client instance creates a request to the AS, identifying itself with its public key and using MTLS to make the request.¶

POST /tx HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json

{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            "backend service", "nightly-routine-3"
        ],
    },
    "client": {
      "key": {
        "proof": "mtls",
        "cert#S256": "bwcK0esc3ACC3DB2Y5_lESsXE8o9ltc05O89jdN-dg2"
      }
    }
}

The AS processes this and determines that the client instance can ask for the requested resources and issues an access token.¶

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
    "access_token": {
        "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0",
        "manage": "https://server.example.com/token",
        "access": [
            "backend service", "nightly-routine-3"
        ]
    }
}

D.4. Asynchronous Authorization

In this scenario, the client instance is requesting on behalf of a specific RO, but has no way to interact with the user. The AS can asynchronously reach out to the RO for approval in this scenario.¶

The client instance starts the request at the AS by requesting a set of resources. The client instance also identifies a particular user.¶

POST /tx HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...
Digest: sha256=...

{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            {
                "type": "photo-api",
                "actions": [
                    "read",
                    "write",
                    "dolphin"
                ],
                "locations": [
                    "https://server.example.net/",
                    "https://resource.local/other"
                ],
                "datatypes": [
                    "metadata",
                    "images"
                ]
            },
            "read", "dolphin-metadata",
            {
                "type": "financial-transaction",
                "actions": [
                    "withdraw"
                ],
                "identifier": "account-14-32-32-3",
                "currency": "USD"
            },
            "some other thing"
        ],
    },
    "client": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO",
    "user": {
        "sub_ids": [ {
            "format": "opaque",
            "id": "J2G8G8O4AZ"
        } ]
  }
}

The AS processes this and determines that the RO needs to interact. The AS determines that it can reach the identified user asynchronously and that the identified user does have the ability to approve this request. The AS indicates to the client instance that it can poll for continuation.¶

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
    "continue": {
        "access_token": {
            "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU"
        },
        "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue",
        "wait": 60
    }
}

The AS reaches out to the RO and prompts them for consent. In this example, the AS has an application that it can push notifications in to for the specified account.¶

Meanwhile, the client instance periodically polls the AS every 60 seconds at the continuation URL.¶

POST /continue HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...

The AS retrieves the pending request based on the handle and determines that it has not yet been authorized. The AS indicates to the client instance that no access token has yet been issued but it can continue to call after another 60 second timeout.¶

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
    "continue": {
        "access_token": {
            "value": "BI9QNW6V9W3XFJK4R02D"
        },
        "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue",
        "wait": 60
    }
}

Note that the continuation handle has been rotated since it was used by the client instance to make this call. The client instance polls the continuation URL after a 60 second timeout using the new handle.¶

POST /continue HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: GNAP BI9QNW6V9W3XFJK4R02D
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...

The AS retrieves the pending request based on the handle and determines that it has been approved and it issues an access token.¶

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
    "access_token": {
        "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0",
        "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\
            M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L",
        "access": [
            "dolphin-metadata", "some other thing"
        ]
    }
}

D.5. Applying OAuth 2.0 Scopes and Client IDs

While GNAP is not designed to be directly compatible with OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], considerations have been made to enable the use of OAuth 2.0 concepts and constructs more smoothly within GNAP.¶

In this scenario, the client developer has a client_id and set of scope values from their OAuth 2.0 system and wants to apply them to the new protocol. Traditionally, the OAuth 2.0 client developer would put their client_id and scope values as parameters into a redirect request to the authorization endpoint.¶

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

HTTP 302 Found
Location: https://server.example.com/authorize\
  ?client_id=7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO\
  &scope=read%20write%20dolphin\
  &redirect_uri=https://client.example.net/return\
  &response_type=code\
  &state=123455

Now the developer wants to make an analogous request to the AS using GNAP. To do so, the client instance makes an HTTP POST and places the OAuth 2.0 values in the appropriate places.¶

POST /tx HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Signature-Input: sig1=...
Signature: sig1=...
Digest: sha256=...

{
    "access_token": {
        "access": [
            "read", "write", "dolphin"
        ],
        "flags": [ "bearer" ]
    },
    "client": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO",
    "interact": {
        "start": ["redirect"],
        "finish": {
            "method": "redirect",
            "uri": "https://client.example.net/return?state=123455",
            "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC"
        }
    }
}

The client_id can be used to identify the client instance's keys that it uses for authentication, the scopes represent resources that the client instance is requesting, and the redirect_uri and state value are pre-combined into a finish URI that can be unique per request. The client instance additionally creates a nonce to protect the callback, separate from the state parameter that it has added to its return URL.¶

From here, the protocol continues as above.¶